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SECTION 1 . The purpose of this thesis is to bring to light the
problems encountered by Henry Sidgwick in his attempt to base
morality^ on the so-called utilitarian principle. According to
utilitarianism, the only moral principle is that one ought to
strive for the greatest happiness of the greatest number of
2
people. Although happiness can be defined more broadly, the
utilitarians define it as pleasure alone.
Henry Sidgwick (1838 - 1900) is generally recognized as the
last of a line of English thinkers to develop primarily this
utilitarian position. A study of Sidgwick* s thought is especially
useful for gaining an understanding of the problems of utilitari-
anism. It is so not only because of his chronological position
1. I shall use the terms "morality" and Methics” as synonyms
throughout this thesis.
2. There is an ethioal theory which is somewhat similar to this
but which substitutes the word "good” for the word "happiness”.
This theory is called ideal utilitarianism and its most prominent
exponent was G. E. Moore. According to this theory many other
things as well as happiness should be maximized.
2-
but also because part of the reason for his occupying this
position is that he so clearly recognized these problems. Indeed,
at least one critic states that Sidgwick* s attempt to solve its
problems almost carried him beyond utilitarianism altogether. 5
Utilitarianism, and Sidgwick as its last exponent, are often
understood as representing part of a more general form of ethical
philosophy known as hedonism. According to hedonism, the only
moral principle is that one ought to strive fori
a. the greatest pleasure of the agent, or
b. the greatest pleasure of the greatest number of people.
When the principle is stated in terms of the first alternative it
is called egoistic, or sometimes individualistic, hedonism. Mem-
bers of the ancient Greek schools of Epicureanism and Cyrenaicism,
as well as modem thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, maintained a
hedonism of this sort. The second alternative, whioh I have re-
ferred to as utilitarianism, is sometimes called universalistio
hedonism by Sidgwick. The principle exponents of utilitarianism,
prior to Sidgwick, were Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.
Hedonistic utilitarianism occurs in two forms. The difference
between the two regards not the goal of utilitarianism but the way
in which this goal is aohieved. According to the form maintained
by Bentham and Mill, which was in general an historically later
form, the greatest happiness (i.e. pleasure) of the greatest number
3. Albee, A History of English Utilitarianism , p. 368.
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xs achieved, directly. By making a comparative measurement of
the pleasure resulting from different possible courses of action,
one chooses that action which will maximize the general pleasure.
This form is more commonly associated with the name '’utilitari-
anism”.
The position of the earlier utilitarianism was that one
should obey unconditional rules of duty which, however, were such
that unquestioned obedience to them would itself achieve the
utilitarian end. Although Sidgwick is, chronologically, the last
of the hedonistic utilitarians, he seems to favor the earlier over
the later form.
SECTION 2 . I begin my study with two chapters on Sidgwick* s
hedonistic background. In Chapter II, I point out some of the
problems of egoistic hedonism which, as it happens, developed
earlier than either form of utilitarianism. This survey also
functions as a brief historical review of all hedonistic theories
prior to Bentham. I only note here the earlier form of utilitar-
ianism. Since Sidgwick carefully discusses the problems of this
form, these problems will be more thoroughly considered in
Chapter VI. Chapter II also reveals, especially in the arguments
of Butler and Hume, reasons for developing utilitarianism as an
alternative to egoistic hedonism.
In Chapter III, I present the later form of utilitarianism,
propounded by Bentham and Mill, indicating what they understood
morality to be and how they reduced it to utilitarianism. My
-4-
reason for considering this later form more thoroughly than the
earlier one is twofold. Firstly, the proponents of the later form
were Sidgwick' s immediate predecessors and his oriticism of their
positions was the point of departure for his own theory. Secondly,
Sidgwick himself presents a rather thorough defense of the earlier
form.
I proceed, in Chapter IV, to expose the problems which
Sidgwick found in the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, partic-
ularly with regard to what they accepted as proof of their theories.
Ihen, in Chapter V and Chapter VI, I present Sidgwick* s own attempt
to reestablish utilitarianism on a firmer foundation. The problems
which he encountered, in so doing, were only partially recognized
by him. In Chapter VI are indicated the problems he encountered,
and generally recognized in trying to make utilitarianism work.
In Chapter VII, I discuss problems of his utilitarianism which he
failed to recognize and which lay hidden until exposed by his
critics.
SECTION 5 * One may attempt to reduce morality to a single prin-
ciple either by discrediting all other principles or by positively
establishing one’s own. Sidgwick and hie predecessors use both
techniques and both, indeed, are neoessary unless one assumes that
there must be one and only one valid moral principle. It is
plausible however that there may be none at all or that there may
be several. If there are none at all, it is not sufficient to
discredit other principles. If there are several, it is not
-5-
sufficient to positively establish one’s own.
The two techniques are designated in this thesis as positive
and negative aspects of the "proof" of utilitarianism. By proof
I merely mean whatever arguments a thinker advances in order to
reduoe morality to this principle. The positive aspect of proof
may conveniently be divided into proof of the validity and proof
of the workability of utilitarianism.
The distinction between positive and negative aspects of
proof is one distinction by which the content of the thesis is
organized. For the discussion of Bentham and Mill, these differ-
ent aspects of proof are considered in different sections of
Chapter III. Chapter IY presents the negative aspect of Sidgwick's
proof. Chapter V concerns his positive proof for the validity of
utilitarianism and Chapter VT, his positive proof for the work-
ability of it.
SECTION 4 . The problems of Sidgwick's utilitarianism, which it is
my purpose to expose, are not in every case unique to utilitar-
ianism. Many of them are related to more general moral issues as
well. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to defining these
issues and certain associated concepts, since an early definition
of them is needed for clarity and perspective.
One great issue concerns whether there is a distinction be-
tween the definition of morality and the actual principles which
are moral. At first glance it appears that there must be such a
distinction. Take, for example, the proposition with which
-6-
Sidgwick is concerned, that "only utilitarianism is moral". If
this proposition is to have any meaning, there must be a defi-
nition of morality which is distinct from utilitarianism. For
if one defines morality as utilitarianism, then Sidgwick’s pro-
position would be simply that "only utilitarianism is utilitar-
ianism" and this is a mere tautology.
Actually, the issue concerning whether the definition of
morality is distinct from moral principles is not so easily
answered, but relates to another issue concerning what the
definition would be if it was considered distinct.
If the definition is considered distinct from the principles
then a further distinction within the definition may be made.
For though all ethical philosophers would probably agree that
morality is, roughly, a sort of standard, they would strongly
disagree on*
a. the source of the standard and
b. that to which the standard applies.
Thus it appears that there is a distinction, within the definition
of morality, between the source and the objeot of the moral stand-
ard. I shall here examine these different views as to the source
and object of morality.
The source of the moral standard may be inside or outside
of the moral agent. Some philosophers claim that the source is
outside—that it is a value independent of the one who holds it.
According to these thinkers whether or not one wants to, say, tell
the truth is completely irrelevent to its morality. Truth telling
-7-
remains something which you ought to do in either ease. It is a
"duty"
.
Now, if a man’s morality is to he judged by standards inde-
pendent of what he wants, it can be so judged only if he is free
to choose or not choose these standards. Yet it is precisely
this free will that an external standard of morality seems to
deny. Duty is defined as something a person does, not because he
wants to but because it is his duty. But why does this person do
the duty which is to do his duty? Is that also his duty? This
sort of answer would apparently lead to an infinite regress in
which a person would never freely choose to do his duty. Duty
would simply be an external force which determined his choices.*
A second group of philosophers hold that the source of the
moral standard is inside the agent. It is merely whatever he
5wants to do~his interest. This view, however, seems to reduce
moral propositions to tautologies. If morality is defined as
whatever one wants to do, then the only way to know what prin-
ciples are moral is to determine what one wants to do. Thus what
one wants to do is moral (i.e. what one wants to do). According
4* David Hume presented an argument similar to this one but sinoe
he held that all actions were predetermined anyway, he was not con-
cerned with the possibility that duty could propel one regardless
of his wishes. He was satisfied to note the infinite regress, as
a ground for holding that the source of the moral standard was in-
terest. (He used the term utility.) See Hume, A Treatise of Human
Nature . Book III, Part II, Seotion If also Jones, A History of
Western Philosophy , Yol. II, p.854*
5. The terms "interest” and "desire" are used throughout this
thesis as virtual synonyms except for their different grammatical
status.
-8-
to this view there is no need for a distinction between definitions
and principles of morality in the first place.
6
So much then for two opposing positions on the source of the
moral standards, and some problems of these positions. There are
also opposing positions regarding the object. The object may be
an act, the intention of an act, or the consequences of an aot.
For the purpose of this thesis, I shall not discuss the distinction
between an act and its intention. I shall merely consider what
seems to me the broader distinction between both an act and its
intention on the one hand and the consequences of an act on the
other.
According to the view that the object of the moral standard
is consequences, a lie, for example, is not wrong in itself but
only when it does not produce the results thatt
a. the agent ought to strive for or
b. the agent wants.
An objection to the object as consequences is that the consequences
7
are impossible to measure because they are infinite. One never
knows whether or not, on balanoe, an act will produoe the proper or
6. This criticism also applies to those who define morality as
whatever a person does in fact do. G. E. Moore, criticizes both
the definition of morality as what a person wants to do, and the
definition as what he does do. His criticism embodies substantially
the argument presented here. See Principla Ethica , Chapter I,
Section 13, (2). Sidgwick uses a related argument in his Methods
of Ethica . See Chapter IV, Section 4 of this thesis.
7. Although Sidgwick believes in the importance of considering
consequences, he himself reoognizes this difficulty.
-9-
desired result.
When an act or the intention of an act is considered to he
the object of morality then that aforementioned lie or the in-
tention to lie would he considered wrong or right in itself. In
discussing this viewpoint, I shall use the term act in reference
to either the act or the intention.
An act cannot he the object of the moral standard until the
act is defined. For it is not obvious at what point the act ends
and the consequences begin. There are two alternative procedures
for defining the act. One alternative is to define it in accord
with one's own or someone else's interest. The second alternative
i8 to define it independently of anyone's interest.
For example, murder is commonly defined in such a way as to
include, primarily, commissions and not ommissions. Thus to
fatally shoot someone is murder hut to choose, in a world of
limited resources, to preserve yourself by letting others starve
to death is not. Some would say this definition was divinely
given and independent of all personal interest. Others would in-
sist that it was based on nothing but the self interest of the
ascendent person.
Regardless of what the source of morality is presumed to be,
8. Sidgwick notes that "... it is difficult to draw the line be-
tween an act and its consequences. . ." A person may, by telling
truth to a jury, knowingly lead them to a false conclusion con-
cerning the accused. Disregard of consequences is only possible
"... where common usage of terms adequately defines what events
are to be included in the general notions of the acts, and what




if the moral standard is applied to acts defined according to
interest then morality as a whole is obviously reduoed to interest.
Furthermore, where the act is defined independent of interest but
the source of morality is interest then again morality as a whole
is mere interest. Only where both the act and the source are in-
dependent of interest is an interest ethics avoided.
The problems of making an act the object of morality will be,
because of their peculiar character, more easily discussed in the
following section.
SECTION 3 * The discussion of general moral issues has now been
completed. It is already evident that there are objections to
both views of the source of the moral standard and to one of the
views of the object of it. Nevertheless, it is necessary in
formulating a definition of morality to accept one of the views
of eaoh of these elements.
There are three different definitions of morality that are
frequently recognized—the “right”, the ’'good”, and "interest”.^
Each of these comprises one of the two views of the source of
morality and one regarding the object of it.
Morality defined as the right comprises the source as duty
and the object as that sort of act which is defined without ref-
erence to interest. A lie, according to this definition, is wrong
regardless of whether or not one wants to lie, and regardless of
consequences.
9. Interest ethics is also sometimes referred to as “naturalism”
.
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Morality defined as interest comprises, in effect, the source
as interest and the object as an act defined in any way at all.
(Actually this definition would also include that circumstance in
which the source is duty but the object is an act defined by in-
terest.) According to interest a lie is wrong only ifs
a. it isn't what you want to do or
b. it isn't defined as you would like or
Ce both*
A principal difficulty with both of these definitions is,
oddly enough, that they are too consistent internally. Morality as
the right denies interest altogether and morality as interest, in
effect, denies the right altogether.
How suppose that you should succeed in showing that the defi-
nition of morality which is really valid is not interest but the
right. It would appear that your success was at the same time its
own defeat since a morality based entirely on duty seems to deny
the free will which such a morality presupposes. (See pg. 7)
The same paradoxical success seems to occur if you prove that
the really valid definition is not the right but interest. For a
definition of morality based entirely on interest ceases to be a
definition at all and becomes a mere tautology. (See pg. 7)
This internal consistency, which rigorously holds these two
definitions to their particular problems, may be called the dis-
tinctive problem whioh arises from defining the object of morality
as an act. In each case the proposition is its own contradiction
and thus the more firmly it is asserted, the more firmly it seems
12-
to be denied.
In contrast to these two internally consistent definitions
is the definition of morality as the good. This definition is
not internally consistent.
There are two ways in which morality can be defined as the
good—the hedonistic and the agathistic. According to the good
generally, a lie is neither moral nor immoral in itself. Whether
or not it becomes so depends upon the results it produces its
consequences. The specifically hedonistic form of the good is
that an act (here the lie) is moral if it results in pleasure but
otherwise it is not. The agathistic form of the good is that a
lie is moral if it has some other specified result such as wisdom
or beauty.
Both forms of the good axe based on belief that the object of
morality is consequences. There is, however, a difference between
them in terms of the source. For the agathistic good, the source
of morality is an independent value—a duty. Thus if wisdom is
what you ought to get (independent of your desire for it) then a
lie which helps you to get it is moral.
The agathistic good is, in terms of its source, similar to the
right . But while the right avoids interest altogether, the
agathistic good does not. What is ultimately good is, it is true,
determined independently of interest. On the other hand, the fact
that it is pursued means that there must be a sort of interest in
it. Writers who hold this view maintain that the value makes itself
-13-
resting . Plato and Aristotle, for example, both thought that
mere recognition of the good would lead you to pursue it.
There is, however, a serious difficulty with the agathistic
good. If the value is interesting, it is so because the moral
agent already has the required interest. For example, one could
not inculcate the principle of fairness in a child by associating
it with, say, self respect unless the child wanted self respect.
But this interest which makes an individual receptive to the aopeal
of the value must itself be created by an independent value. Other-
wise, one will have not an agathistic good but an interest ethics ,
how if this interest is created by a value, then there must be a
further interest. It seems apparent that the definition of morality
as the agathistic good leads to infinite regress or else results in
interest ethics.
One can attempt to resolve this problem of the agathistic good
in another way by claiming (as in fact Sidgwick does) that the duty
itself gives an "impulse” to action without any need for interest
per se. This argument, however, seems to transform the agathistic
good back into its analogue—the right. In that case it faces the
usual criticism of the right that there seems to be no free will.
For the hedonistic good the source of morality is interest.
If wisdom is what you want to get, for example, then a lie which
helps you to get it is moral.
The hedonistic good is, in terms of its source, similar to
interest ethics . Their different objects are reflected in two dif-
ferent definitions of pleasure which are frequently employed.
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According to one definition, pleasure means interest per se—
what you want. When an interest ethics is called hedonistic
(which it sometimes is) this is the definition being used. The
second definition of pleasure is that it is the satisfaction of
what you want. This definition applies to the hedonistic good
and is, perhaps, the more commonly employed one.
While interest avoids any independent value whatsoever, the
hedonistic good does not. According to hedonism, although inter-
est ultimately determines the end, this end is in a sense inde-
pendent. Writers who hold this view maintain that interest makes
the satisfaction of itself an independent value . Thus what you
are interested in, and therefore pursue, is not some specific entity
itself suoh as wisdom or beauty, but rather the satisfaction of in-
terest in such wisdom or beauty. As will be shown, Mill and Bentham
maintain this position.
The hedonistic good seems to encounter as serious a difficulty
as does the agathistic good. If the moral agent creates a value
out of the satisfaction of his interest, then he must have an inter-
est in this value different from the interest which is a constituent
of the value. For example, suppose that one has a desire for wisdom.
If the satisfaction of the desire for wisdom consequently becomes
a "good”, then there must be a desire for this good, in other words
a "higher" desire for the satisfaction of the initial desire. This
higher desire, or interest, must also become a value—the satis-
faction of the higher desire. Otherwise, at the level of the higher
desire, which is fundamental, one would have not a hedonistic good
-15-
—- ari izitereat ethics . If the higher desire makes its own satis-
faction a value as well, then there must be an even higher desire
for this value. In other words if the desire for the satisfaction
of the desire for wisdom is, in itself, good, then there must be a
desire for the satisfaction of the desire for the satisfaction of
the desire for wisdom. It seems apparent that the hedonistic good,
like the agathlstlc, leads to infinite regress.
One can attempt to resolve this problem in another way by
claiming (as Mill and Bentham do) that the value is a "first prin-
ciple", but is not thereby independent of interest. Unless one
believes that a mere process of labelling can solve problems,
however, it seems that this argument simply transforms the hedonistic
good back into its analogue—interest ethics. In that case it faces
the usual criticism that moral propositions are reduced to tautologies.
Having discussed some of the problems which arise from the in-
ternal inconsistency of morality when it is defined as the good, I
now want to indicate what seems to be its unique advantage. Suppose
one should succeed in establishing the validity of the hedonistic
as opposed to the agathistic good. One would not thereby have auto-
matically defeated oneself as seems to be the case in an attempt to
establish the right or interest. For neither form of the good is
self contradictory * This does not mean, however, that the moral
agent is necessarily better off with morality defined as a form of
the good than he would be if it were defined as the right or inter-
est. In the case of either form of good there is an additional pro-
blem which has already been mentioned in the previous seotion.
-16-
Locality as the good measures the consequences of an act (rather
than the act itself) hut the consequences are infinite and there,
fore impossible to measure. Paced with this fact, one has two
choices. One can postulate an infinite moral code hut this will
convert an ethics of good into a straightforward ethics of right.
If, however, one doesn't do this, he will he left to interpret
the morality of an act only in terms of interest. This alter-
native converts the ethics of good into an ethics of interest.
SECTION 6 . One may now say that altogether there are four dif-
ferent ways of defining morality, each of which seems to have
serious logical difficulties. When a philosopher attempts to
reduce morality to some one principle he will inevitably en-
counter these difficulties either directly or indirectly. He
may also encounter empirical difficulties—difficulties resulting
from the fact that moral action must occur within the limitations
of time and space. Actually these so-called empirical difficul-
ties raise other logical difficulties, particularly in connection
with the question as to whether time and space are dimensions with-
in which moral action occurs or attributes of the moral agent
himself. Consideration of these other logical difficulties will
have to he emitted in a limited thesis of this sort, resulting
in a necessarily oversimplified treatment of the empirical diffi-
culties.
In addition to the difficulties involved in defining morality,
one might also expect to find difficulties in establishing, within
-17-
any particular definition, those actual principles which are moral.
Sidgwick does seem to conceive of his function as involving both
steps. It should be noted, however, that the difficulties involved
in establishing speoific principles, seem often to be a reflection
of the difficulties in the definitions upon which they are based.
For example, there do not seem to be any distinct problems in
knowing what exactly is moral if morality is defined either as in-
terest or as the hedonistic good. It is a matter of knowing what
one wants. In the case of the right or the agathistic good, prin-
ciples will have to be ultimately established by some kind of
intuition and the kind of intuition employed can itself only be
referred to another intuition—not to interest.
This thesis is concerned with exposing the problems Sidgwick
encounters in his attempt to reduce morality to the principle of
utilitarianism. Particular attention will be paid to the logical
difficulties involved in defining morality and it is for that
reason that these have been discussed at some length here. In the
following chart, the four different definitions are listed, to-
gether with their distinctive problems. For convenience in sub-
sequent discussion the definitions of the right and interest have
been generally designated as "monisms” to indicate*
1. that either interest or duty is completely denied*
2. that in consequence, both definitions seem to be self
contradictory.
Also as a matter of convenience the two definitions of the good
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1* that Merest and. duty are combined in some way in each
definition;
2. that in consequence both definitions require the impossible
task of measuring infinite consequences.
oidgwick’s attempt to reduce morality to utilitarianism will
necessarily involve two steps (though as it happens not explicitly).
First it must be established that morality is defined dualistically
and not monistically; for utilitarianism is a goal to be pursued
and thus a good. Secondly it must be established that the good is
of one particular sort. It might at first appear that utilitar-
ianism is a species of hedonistic good and that it is therefore
this form of good which should be established. Such is not neces-
sarily the case however. In the loose sense used in Section 1,
utilitarianism is a form of hedonistic good. In a stricter logical
sense it does not seem to be so. For to the individual moral agent)
the pursuit of the general happiness is virtually as independent
of his own interest as would be the pursuit of wisdom, beauty or
any similar goal. In this sense utilitarianism is a species of the
agathistic good.
From the preceding discussion it would appear then that
Sidgwick must*
a. establish that morality is defined as some form of the
good and not as the right or interest;
b. establish that morality is the agathistic and not the
hedonistic good.
. establish, by an intuition of course, that the onlyo
-20-
prinoiple which ia good is utilitarianism.
Insofar as Sidgwick concerns himself with logioal as well as
empirical difficulties of ethics he does, to some extent, follow a
procedure of this sort. Nevertheless there are two important
qualifications to this statement. In the first place Sidgwick is
not clearly and unambiguously concerned with reducing ethics to
ai*ianism . lie is often considered a utilitarian but in his
principal ethical work he implies, in the introduotoiy chapter,
that he is primarily concerned with establishing the validity of
all clearly distinct definitions of morality. Actually his book
involves a mixture of both purposes.
The second qualification, related to the first, is that
Sidgwick is no more willing than were some of his predecessors to
accept utilitarianism as an expression of only one of the two forms
of good. He hopes, as they did, that the pursuit of the general
happiness is somehow at the same time the pursuit of one's own.
Thus utilitarianism would be a principle which affirmed and also
combined both the agathistic and the hedonistic good.
It would be difficult to explore all the arguments involved
in these various purposes. I Bhall concentrate, in this thesis,
on an attempt to trace that thread of argument whioh is used to
reduce morality to utilitarianism, noting the other purposes as
they relate thereto.
Given the above qualifications, Sidgwick's "proof" of
utilitarianism involves the three steps previously noted. This
proof will also involve positive and negative aspects as were
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discussed in Section 5. In view of the problems of the different
definitions of morality, one can predict that the positive aspect
of proof will involve j
a. resolving the problem of measuring infinite consequences
which any good seems to require;
b. eliminating the infinite regress of duties which an
agathistic good seems to encounter.
I'or the negative aspect of proof there are at hand all of the
difficulties which confront the three other definitions of morality
Throughout the following chapters, the various logical diffi-
culties heretofore noted should be kept in mind, f/hether or not
these difficulties are directly recognized by the thinker, they
are always present and may well be the source of whatever diffi-
culties do appear, even though these appear in greatly altered form
CHAPTER II
HEDONISM PRIOR TO BENTHAM
SECTION l .
1
Hedonism (understood in its loose sense and not as
the hedonistic good) occurs in two forms which may be called
egoistic hedonism and universalistic hedonism (or utilitarian-
ism). In the history of hedonism, the egoistic form was, in
general, the first to be developed. Not until the seventeenth
century was the universalistic form, of which Sidgwick was the
last exponent, clearly set forth. Although I am primarily con-
cerned with the problems of utilitarianism, it is necessary for
me to briefly review the earlier form of hedonism. This is nec-
essary for two reasons. Firstly, some of the principal problems
of hedonism which Sidgwick encounters had already been exposed in
earlier times. Secondly, it was the severe critioism of egoistic
hedonism by David Hume and others that provided some of the impetus
for the development of utilitarianism, particularly the earlier
form.
1. The exposition of this section is based on the following
sources s Plato, The Republio and The Philebus ; Randall and Buchler
Philosophy* An Introduction * and Watson, Hedonistic Theories from
Aristippus to Spencer .
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Cyrenaicisa, an ancient Greek school of thought, is often
recognized as the first systematic expression of egoistic hedonism.
Its members held that one should pursue the pleasure of the moment,
primarily sensual pleasure, and should avoid thought—for thought
prevented full enjoyment. ‘The Cyrenaics held furthermore that
nothing was immoral, no matter how much it might seem so, if it
provided such pleasure.
Ihose who adhered to the later Greek school of Epicureanism
agreed that the individual 1 s pleasure was the only good but they
meant by this the pleasure of life as a whole, not that of the
moment. The Epicureans also agreed that nothing pleasurable was
immoral but they held that most so-called immoral acts carried with
them the painful fear of punishment and so really were immoral.
Both Plato and Aristotle criticized these hedonistic prin-
ciples and presented various arguments to show that the pursuit of
pleasure was self- defeating. Some of these arguments, together
with later ones, constitute what has come to be called the
"Hedonistic Paradox".
Plato observed that it was logically impossible to pursue
pleasure alone, for pleasure which was separate even from conscious-
ness was no more than animal experience and could hardly be called
pleasure at all. Yet we noticed above that the Cyrenaics meant to
attain virtually this sort of pleasure. How then did they avoid
its difficulty? They did so by a certain lack of consistency.
Thought interfered with pleasure, so they said, but nevertheless
on8 should use all one's cunning to determine the relative pleasure
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which attended the various goods of life.
Aristotle, in his criticism, observed that if the hedonists
were successful in achieving great pleasure, then they could not
possibly achieve the pleasure of life as a whole since individual
pleasurable experiences would distract one from necessary reflec-
tion. Now the Epicureans did expect to do both and, like the
Cyrenaics, their attempt here required some inconsistency.
Greatest pleasure for the Epicureans meant merely mental serenity
and, in general, avoidance of pain.
Thus according to Plato and Aristotle if you sought pleasure
directly you were not apt to achieve it; and the inconsistencies
in the hedonism of their time seemed to bear out this contention.
It might be noted that these arguments of Plato and Aristotle are,
on their face, empirical arguments. The conscious reflective
pursuit of pleasure cannot be undertaken simultaneously with an
unconscious spontaneous enjoyment of it. The factor of time pre-
vents this.
2
SECTION 2. Although Epicurus had held that one ought to seek
only one’s own happiness, he had not, a3 had Thomas Hobbes in the
modern period, rigidly maintained that man oould seek nothing else.
For Hobbes, man was a thoroughgoing egoist whose impulses were all
strictly determined. John Locke also held this view though, in
order to permit man to achieve his greatest overall happiness, he
2. The following exposition is based on these sources* Jones,
A History of Western Philosophy Vol. II; oidgwick, Outlines of
The History of Ethics for English Readers * and Watson, Hedonistic
Theories from Aristippus to Spencer .
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also held inconsistently that a man could suspend these impulses
and exercise thought. David Hume, who agreed with Hobbes and that
part of Locke which was deterministic, denied however that man was
naturally egoistic. On the one hand, he argued empirically that
the facts did not indicate this. Perhaps more important however
was his logical argument, an argument which had previously been
advanced by Joseph Butler. Hume maintained that pleasure was, as
it certainly appeared to be, the satisfaction of a desire. Now
obviously one couldn't satisfy a desire unless one had a desire
iix the first place. And this first desire would then have to be
for something other than pleasure. Therefore, stated Hume, it was
obvious that a man could not seek only his own pleasure—it was
logically impossible.
It appears that this argument which Hume and Butler advance
against egoistic hedonism is a reexpression of the logical diffi-
culty which faces the hedonistic good. According to the argument
in Chapter I, the satisfaction of interest must be the object of
a higher interest whose satisfaction must in turn be the object
of a still higher interest and so on ad infinitum. Suppose how-
ever that one persists in claiming that the satisfaction of inter-
est is the object of the self same interest. The difficulties of
this position are those revealed by the argument of Butler and
Hume. Hume's argument seems conclusive against egoistic hedonism.
However, in Hume's time and earlier, the tendency was not to discard
hedonism completely but to present it primarily in the utilitarian
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form/
From the time of Richard Cumberland there had been English
moralists who held that moral actions must be directed to achieve-
ment of the general happiness/ These early utilitarians held,
however, that one did not pursue the general happiness directly.
Morality required obedience to absolute rules but these rules were
of just such a sort as to bring about this result if followed.
Hume severely criticized the notion of absolute rules, claiming
that whatever a man did was always ultimately a matter of interest
This criticism had considerable influence on Jeremy Bentham who,
as we shall see in the next chapter, changed the nature of utili-
tarianism to a straightforward hedonism of the universalistic sort
The utilitarianism of Bentham was not developed as an alternative
to egoistio hedonism however. It comprised both forms of hedonism
3. Hume did not even discard egoistic hedonism. He denied only
the contention that it was the sole end of man.




SECTION 1 . Jeremy Bentham
1
is often considered the first major
exponent of the direct form of utilitarianism. While the earlier
utilitarians had held that doing one's duty, whatever it might be,
was the best way to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest
number of people, Bentham maintained that the best and indeed only
proper way to do this was to determine the overall pleasure re-
sulting from different aots, and to choose those which produced
the most pleasure. Thus was ushered in that form of utilitar-
ianism which is most commonly associated with the name. Bentham
2
was its most consistent exponent, followed by J. S. Mill and
Sidgwick, the last of whom showed a strong tendency back toward
1. Jeremy Bentham (1748 - 1832) was trained in law but did not
practice it, devoting himself instead to legal and economic theory.
The following discussion of his thought is based on his Introduc-
tion to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789).
2. John Stuart Mill (1806 - I876) held a permanent position as
head of an important branch of the government administration. The
discussion of his thought is based primarily on his Utilitarianism
(I863) but some reference is also made to the essay On Liberty
(1059).
28-
the earlier position. The purpose of this chapter is to present
the positions of Bentham, J. S. Mill, and briefly, those of
Herbert Spencer. The latter maintained a special form of utili-
tarianism of considerable influence in Sidgwiok's day. I shall
concentrate on the aspects of these positions most directly con-
nected with the reduction of morality to the utilitarian principle
and those directly criticized by Sidgwick in the development of
his own position. My analysis of these thinkers is based on the
considerations discussed in Sections 5 through 6 of Chapter I. I
consider both the positive and negative aspects of reduction. I
also consider both the definition of morality whieh is given and
the attempt to prove that only utilitarianism is moral. Actually
the previous chapter's discussion suggests that once a definition
of morality lias been established there are no particular problems
involved in determining the principles which are moral. In any
event, special attention will be paid to the explicit and implicit
definitions of morality which are set forth and upon which the
moral principles axe based.
SECTION 2 . Bentham defines utility as:
"...that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce
benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this
in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes
again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief
pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is con
sidered: if that party be the community in general, then the
5. Herbert Spencer (1820 - 1905) - The brief comments which
follow are largely based on a synopsis of his ethical works con-
tained in Albee's A History of English Utilitarianism.
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happiness of the community! if a particular individual,
then the happiness of that individual."^
The principle of utility (i.e. of utilitarianism) he defines as:
"...that principle which approves or disapproves of every
action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it
appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the
party whose interest is in question. . ."5
As he defines it, Bentham’s principle of utility requires the
pursuit of both individual happiness and general happiness, accord-
ing to which is in Question. His principle therefore encompasses
both egoistic hedonism and utilitarianism. One may well ask if
these two forms of hedonism can be reconciled to each other, par-
ticularly since they seem to be based on different definitions of
ethics. Morality cannot be defined in two different ways unless
these definitions are reconciled to each other. In the Principles .
Benthem relies on the legislator to make it pleasurable for the
individual to pursue the general welfare, by punishing him if he
does not. Thus individual morality seems to be reduced to egoistic
hedonism. So far as the individual is concerned, what is moral is
to pursue his own pleasure but the most expedient way to do this
is to pursue the general pleasure.
The issue is not, however, this clear out for Bentham. For
when the legislator makes the utilitarian principle attractive,
this principle remains of independent worth even though the person
is pursuing it only because it is to his own self interest. As




Bentham puts it, the sanctions are sources of obligatory power.
In the Deontology
, a posthumous work prepared from various un-
published manuscripts, Bentham is presented as claiming that man
naturally gets most individual pleasure by pursuing the general
pleasure. While this may be an inaccurate description of Bentham* s
position it is possible that he hoped such a state of affaire
might eventually be brought about by an exact manipulation of
sanctions.^
I would note at this point that if it can be proven that the
forced pursuit of general happiness is nevertheless of distinct
moral worth, then it would appear that the principle which results
is based upon a definition of morality as both the agathistic good
and the hedonistic good combined into one. For utilitarianism is
not, except with this merger, a form of hedonistic good. Otherwise
it is based on intuition, not interest.
SECTION 3 . To prove that utilitarianism is moral is, says Bentham,
unnecessary and impossible, for what is used to prove everytiling
else cannot be itself proved. Nevertheless, he does give a sort of
proof in the first page of his work -
’’Nature lias placed mankind under the governance of two
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure . It is for them alone
to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what
we shall do... The principle of utility recognizes this sub-
jection, and assumes it for the foundation of the system...”^
6. See Sidgwick. Outlines of the History of Ethics for English
Readers , p. 233*
7. Introduction to the Principles of liorals and Legislation ,
p. 125.
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Thie method of proving utilitarianism (or showing that it needs
no proof) relies on what is called psychological hedonism. Accord-
ing to psychological hedonism it is a fact that men do pursue only
pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Psychological hedonism is
thus distinguished from ethical hedonism which is the doctrine
merely that men ought to pursue only pleasure and avoidance of pain.
Bentham claims that both doctrines are true without explicitly in-
dicating that one proves the other. J. S. Mill, as we shall
shortly see, explicitly holds that psychological hedonism proves
ethical hedonism. He indicates two different ways in which this
proof occurs. The most cogent of these may have been that which
Bentham also had in mind. Mill argues that if man does in fact
pursue only pleasure, then this must include what he ought to
pursue, since moral conduct is a part of conduct in general.
Psychological hedonism occurs in two forms and it is sometimes
difficult to determine which of them a thinker means, or whether
he confuses the two and uses them both interchangeably. In both
forms, this doctrine actually seems to have implications not only
for the principles of morality but, even more, for the very de-
fining of it. Since Bentham’ s concern with moral principles is
very closely related to his concern with defining morality, I want
to indicate here what these implications are.
The difference between the two forms of psychological hedonism
is based on a difference in the definition of pleasure. What may
be called the logical form defines pleasure as whatever a person
desires and is certainly true because tautological. If a martyr
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chooses to go to the stake he must ultimately have wonted to do so
and if pleasure is defined as whatever he wants, then the stake
must be, in this sense, pleasurable. As was mentioned in Chapter I,
this first definition of pleasure is applicable to interest ethics.
Consequently the logical form of psychological hedonism, if it
proves anything at all, proves that the definition of morality is
interest—not the hedonistic good. (Of course it would not seem
tiiat a tautology could really prove anything.
)
The second form of psychological hedonism, which may be called
empirical, defines pleasure not as desire but as the satisfaction
of desire. It is not true by definition, as it is with the logical
form, that men pursue only the satisfaction of desire. If this
doctrine is true it must be so by empirical evidence. Nevertheless,
it is this form which, if true, would prove that morality is the
hedonistic good.
It is not clear whether the psychological hedonism which
Bentham uses as a proof of utilitarianism is of the empirical or
the logical form. On the one hand, he considers pleasure as a goal
to be pursued and in that case his psychological hedonism would
seem empirical. For one would not be likely to pursue mere desire
but rather the satisfaction of desire. Furthermore, Bentham implies
that the pursuit of pleasure is a meaningfully moral obligation—he
olaims to be writing a work about what ought to be and not merely
what is. Further still, Bentham states, with disapproval, that
when a person claims to be basing his actions on some duty, he is
really simply basing them on whatever he feels like doing and then
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calling that a duty. Thus Bentham seems to deny interest ethics,
in which case he presumably would not he using the form of
psychological hedonism which assumes such ethics*
On the other hand, Bentham’ a comments when he comes to
explicitly define morality suggest that, after all, it is the
logical form of psychological hedonism that he has in mind. Ac-
cording to him utilitarianism is not only moral but the very defi-
nition of morality!
'Of an action that is conformable to the principle of
utility one may always say either that it is one that ought
to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to
be done... When thus interpreted, the words ought, and right
and wrong, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when
otherwise they have none.'1®
To put it another way, seeking the greatest happiness of the
greatest number is moral (i.e. seeking the greatest happiness of
the greatest number) . This is a mere tautology. How since, for
Bentham, seeking the greatest happiness of the greatest number is,
or is made, the most effective way to seek one’s own happiness it
would seem that the tautologous nature of utilitarianism was re-
lated to a similarly tautologous kind of egoistic hedonism. Such
a hedonism would be established by the logical form of psycholog-
ical hedonism, which is that one cannot desire anything other than
what one desires.
Another indication that it is the logical form of psycholog-
ical hedonism which Bentham uses is his criticism of all duties.
He claims that there are no absolute duties. Yet according to the
8. Ibid,, p. 127.
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explanation of an ethics of good in Chapter I, any "good" must be
in a sense, absolute and independent of interest. It is the logical
form of psychological hedonism which establishes pure interest
ethics.
Insofar as the nature of Bentham ’
b
psychological hedonism is
unclear, hie definition of morality is also unclear as are also the
problems accompanying it. It is certain, however, that he does
not define morality as the right. Indeed it is the criticism of
that definition whioh constitutes his principal negative proof of
utilitarianism.
SECTION 4. If utilitarianism is right, says Bentham, then to show
that other principles are wrong, all one needs do is to show that
they differ. Nevertheless he does somewhat more than this and thus
his comments here do contribute to his proof. He distinguishes two
other principles—that of "asceticism" and that of "sympathy and
antipathy" •
According to Bentham, asceticism is the exaot opposite of
utilitarianism. It approves those actions whioh increase pain and
decrease pleasure. It has never been consistently pursued, notes
Bentham, and if it was so pursued by any substantial number of
people it would turn the world into a hell.
Perhaps more significant than asceticism, whioh seems to me
an almost purely theoretical construct, is the principle which holds
that the approval of an action is its own justification and does
not depend on any resultant increase or decrease of happiness. As
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Benthorn defines it, this principle is equivalent to both duty and
interest ethics.
It -was indicated in Chapter I that a very sharp distinction
is usually made between interest ethics and duty ethics (the ethics
of right) . Duty ethics holds not only that what you ought to do
is not simply what you want to do but further that duty in general
should be done for its own sake and not because you want to do it.
Bentham denies this distinction and considers that duty ethics is
really nothing but concealed interest ethics despite others of his
statements which suggest that he himself agrees with interest
ethics. His reason for equating duty and interest seems to rest
on the observation that moral systems vary greatly as to their
standards of right and it appears therefore that the standards
which they hold absolute must simply be their own preferences.
Bentham concludes, therefore, that the principle of sympathy and
antipathy is really the negation of all principle.
It will be noted that this criticism of an ethics of right is
not the same as that given in the introduction. Bentham’ s oriti-
oism rests on the assumption that what is a duty for one must be
a duty for all and that what is a duty at one moment must be so at
the pext. Denying this assumption, as some contemporary thinkers
such as Karl Barth do, seems to involve no immediate logical con-
tradictions however. Of course there may be practical difficulties
as when one person's performance of his duty interferes with an-
other's performance of his.
One could not expect Bentham to criticize an ethics of right
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for its denial of free will since he himself seems to do the same,
claiming that moral action is based on natural necessity. This
difficulty the denial of free will—is nevertheless still there.
At any rate, Bentham concludes from his discussion that
asceticism is self-defeating, sympathy and antipathy is not a
principle at all and we are left with utilitarianism as the only
right principle to be governed by.
SECTION
ft.
Bentham holds that utilitarianism is a workable prin-
ciple. It is not easy to apply—indeed there are considerable
practical difficulties but there are (apparently) no logical con-
tradictions for him. To achieve the greatest happiness one must
measure and compare pleasures. Each pleasure or pain considered
by itself must be measured for its intensity, duration, certainty
or uncertainty and propinquity or remoteness. The act which pro-
duces the feeling must be measured for fecundity—its likelihood
to produce more of the same, for purity—its likelihood not to
produce the opposite, and for extent—the number of persons who
are affected by it. To determine whether the tendency of any par-
ticular act is good or bad one merely sums up, using the above
measurements, the values of eaoh pleasure and each pain which
appears to be produced by the act. If the balance is on the side
of pleasure, then the aot has a good tendency; if not, it has a
bad one. This balance can be determined for every individual
affected by the act or for the community as a whole.
In the latter case one sums up the degrees of good tendency
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for each individual for whom the act is good on the whole. One
does the same with the degrees of had tendency for those indi-
viduals for whom the act is had on the whole. One then suhstracts
the total degrees of had tendency from the total degrees of good
tendency to find the balance for the community as a whole.
It Is not to he expected, says Bentham, that this process will
he strictly followed prior to every moral judgment, but it may he
kept in vie?/ and should (presumably) he applied as closely as
possible. Indeed it is such a process that men customarily employ
in deciding what to do.
SECT1QU 6 . I have indicated briefly how Bentham reduces morality
to utilitarianism. I have considered both his definition of
morality and his attempt to show that only utilitarianism is moral,
though the latter seems, according to some statements, to involve
a different definition of morality. I have also considered both
the positive and negative aspects of his proof. We must now dis-
cuss these same elements in the utilitarianism of J. S. Mill.
Bentham meant by utility the greatest happiness of the great-
est number, but he also meant the greatest happiness of each indi-
vidual and apparently assumed that the two could be reconciled.
Mill explicitly states thatt
"...the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of
what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness,
but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and
that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be strictly
impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator."^
9. Utilitarianism , p. 24
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Mill too, however, seems to assume that the general happiness
and the agent's own happiness can he fairly easily reconciled. He
believes, as does Bentham, that enticing or forcing a person to
pursue the utilitarian goal does not destroy the morality of such
pursuit. And he has his own reasons for expounding, much like
Bentham, the even holder doctrine that man naturally gets most
individual pleasure hy pursuing the general pleasure. According
to him, man' 8 concern for the general happiness is in a sense a
natural outgrowth of his awareness of dependence on others for
satisfaction of his own desires.
SECTION 7. Mill, like Bentham, holds that utilitarianism, as a
first principle, is incapable of proof in the ordinary sense of
the word, hut he prefers to describe this situation as one in
which a sort of proof is still possible rather than one in which
there is no proof at all.
Again like Bentham, Mill proves utilitarianism (in one way)
by a form of psychological hedonism hut he also attempts, in con-
trast to Bentham, to prove psychological hedonism itself. Proof
of the latter, according to him, is possible only hy experience.
It is a question of fact to he determined hy self-observation and
the observation of others. Thus Mill seems explicitly to state,
at least at this point, that the only form of psychological
hedonism which can he proven, if any can, is the empirical form
(for the truth of the logical form does not, of course, depend on
experience). But he then goes on to present his belief that
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empirlcal obeervations will establish the Identity of desire and
pleasure!
"I believe that these sources of evidence, impartially con-
sulted, will declare that desiring a thing and finding it
pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are
phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the
same phenomena} in strictness of language, two different
modes of naming the same psychological fact.., ”7^°
If pleasure and desire are two words with the same referent, then
they may be considered definitions of each other. The definition
of pleasure as desire rather than satisfaction of desire is that
upon which the logical, not the empirical, form of psychological
hedonism is based. There are other indications also, that it is
not only the empirical form which Mill has in mind. For example,
when he comes to explicitly define morality, he calls it a feeling
of obligation which evolves when a person recognizes that he de-
pends upon others for satisfaction of his own desires. Now this
seems to imply that morality is merely self interest, regardless
of how enlightened it may be. Again it is the logical form of
psychological hedonism which would establish interest ethics.
In Mill as in Bentham, I find it difficult to determine which
form of psychological hedonism is really intended. One fact seems
certain, however. Whether or not Mill’s psychological hedonism
derives its cogency implicitly from the logical form, it is not
explicitly accepted as merely tautological.
If psychological hedonism is true, says Mill, then ethical
hedonism must be true. If pleasure is the sole end of all human
10. Ibid., p. 58.
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conduot then it mist obviously be the end of moral oonduot since
that is merely a particular kind of conduct.
The psychological hedonism which he establishes, Mill uses
as one proof of ethical hedonism generally. But he has another
proof in connection with which he establishes utilitarianism per
se (although the aspect of that second proof which establishes
utilitarianism could be used with the first proof as well). Of
Mil 1 s two proofs, psychological hedonism can function independ-
ently but the other requires psychological hedonism in addition
to itself, as ’/rill be shown. This second proof also depends on
empirical observation.
"The only proof oapable of being given that an objeot is
visible is that people actually see it. The only proof
that a sound is audible, is that people hear it; and so
of the other sources of our experience. In like manner,
I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce
that anything is desirable is that people do actually
desire it."**
In other words the only proof there can be for the desirable, here
meaning the ultimate end or what ought to be desired, is that it
is in fact desired. Now Mill establishes, by his psychological
hedonism, that the only thing which is in fact desired is the indi-
vidual’s own happiness and the immediate inference from this would
be that that is the only thing that ought to be desired (which is
the position of egoism). Mill, however does not draw this inference
alone. Concerning utilitarianism, which is after all what he in-
tends to prove, he states that!
11. Ibid., pp. 52-3*
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Zl*nt l S
V6n 7 he gener&1 ^PPiness is desirable,excep that each person, so far as he believes it to be attain!able, desires his own happiness. This however, being a fact,we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, butall which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good,that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and thegeneral hanpmess, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all
persons.
Mill's argument restated seems to be:
a. the individual desires only his own pleasure,
b. the pleasure of the aggregate of individuals is therefore
desired,
c. the pleasure of the aggregate of individuals therefore
ought to be desired,
d. the individual ought to desire the aggregate pleasure.
In the argument, Mill apparently means by "desirable" both
what ought to be desired and what is desired, otherwise c. does
not follow from b. It also appears that d. does not follow from c.
but this point we will consider later.
The ambiguity in the meaning of desirable functions as Mill's
other proof but it does not establish ethical hedonism unless what
is in fact desired is only pleasure. In other words, it requires
psychological hedonism in addition to itself.
We may conclude that there are, for Mill, two positive proofs
of ethical hedonism generally, one of which functions independently
while the other does not. Propositions a. through c. can be es-
tablished by either one of the two. By the first proof they would
be established as follows:
12. Ibid., p. 53.
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Deaire and pleasure are identical—therefore propositions
a. and b. are true;
If pleasure is the sole end of all human conduct, then it must
be the end of moral oonduct which is merely a particular kind
of conduct—therefore proposition c. is true.
By the second proof these propositions would be established as
follows
i
Desire and pleasure are identical—therefore propositions a.
and b. are true.
The only proof that anything is desirable (meaning apparently,
Both worthy of desire and desired) is that it is desired—
therefore proposition c. is true.
There is, in addition to the two proofs of ethical hedonism gener-
ally, a single proof for utilitarianism per se which is used by
Mill in connection with the second proof but could, it seems, be
used with the first, instead.
Of these three proofs Bentham also appears to have used one
—
namely the first of the two proofs for ethical hedonism in general.
As cumbersome and dubious as these proofs may themselves appear
to be, one must keep in mind the further difficulty that both of the
proofs for ethical hedonism in general are based on a psychological
hedonism which has not been clearly defined.
SECTION 8 . Both Bentham and Mill seem to be more explicitly and
thoroughly concerned with establishing the proposition that only
utilitarianism is moral than they are with establishing a definition
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of morality in the first place. For, when it cornea to the negative
aspect of proof—the discrediting of all definition of morality
other than that on which utilitarianism ia based, there is only
one definition which they completely and clearly oppose. That is
the ethics of right.
Both thinkers believe that by a manipulation of reward and
punishment a man oan be made to get most individual pleasure by
pursuing the general pleasure. They further believe that this use
of sanctions does not destroy the distinct moral worth of the
general pleasure. As was previously noted, this position would
seem to imply a merger of the agathistio and the hedonistic good.
Neither thinker makes clear which type of psychological
hedonism he is using as a proof of utilitarianism. Since only one
type is applicable to the hedonistic good while the other is appli-
cable to interest ethics, there is no clear opposition to interest
ethics either.
Mill, like Bentham, does clearly oppose the ethics of right.
According to Mill, there is only one moral principle, besides
utilitarianism, which appears in any way to be a really distinct
and independent principle. This principle is justice. Justice,
however, only appears to be a distinct principle but is not actually
so; for it provides no means of reconciling different views as to
what exactly is just.
"Not only have different nations and individuals different
notions of justice, but in the mind of one and the same
individual, justice is not some one rule, principle, or maxim,
but many, which do not always coincide in their dictates,
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and in choosing between which,
extraneous standard, or by his
he is guided either by some
own personal predilections."1 ^
This appears to be a pivotal argument, not only for Mill but also
for Bentham (and to some extent, for Sidgwiok as well). We find
it in Bentham in his criticism of the so-called principle of
sympathy and antipathy where he concluded that moral rules are
really nothing but personal preferences. As with Bentham, so with
illll, this criticism seems to be primarily practical in nature.
Proponents of the right can easily explain how an individual ohooses
between conflicting duties. He does so by a "higher" duty. An in-
finite regress of duties seems, of course, to imply a lack of free
will but Mill does not seem to be any more concerned with free will
than Bentham was. It is not this logical difficulty of the right
upon which he bases his critioiam.
For Mill, the only way to reconcile the various contradictory
notions of justice is to submit them to the utilitarian standard.
Indeed, says he, the only reason that justice appears to be inde-
pendent of utility in the first place is because it is concerned
with the broadest and strongest interest of man—namely his security.
The sentiment of justice has developed out of what are, or resemble,
two natural instincts—that of self-defence and that of sympathy.
These become the desire to punish one who does harm and the belief
that there is a definite individual to whom harm has been done.
These standards are so necessary to us that we come to think of
them as absolute though they are not.
13. Ibid., p. 82.
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SECTI£N_2. Mill, like Bentham, believes that utilitarianism is
workable. He argues that the complications involved in measuring
pleasure are not overwhelming. To assess the consequences of an
action there is the whole past experience of mankind.
Mil differs from Bentham very sharply in one respect. In
defending utilitarianism against those who call it a doctrine
worthy only of swine, Mill claims that it is perfectly consistent
with the doctrine to recognize distinctions in the quality of
pleasure as well as distinctions in quantity. The test of whether
one pleasure is higher than another is whether or not all or most
of those who have experience of both prefer the one to the other
regardless of any feeling of obligation to do so. Now a test of
this sort, having no criterion independent of simple desire, except
the proviso that it be a general desire, would not seem to be
measuring differences in quality but rather those differences in
quantity which need considerable experience to discover. It would
seem to be measuring, in other words, what Bentham called the
fecundity, purity and extent of an act.
We cannot, however, infer merely from the nature of his
measuring tool, that Mill does not really support distinctions in
quality. He explicitly notes the tendency of utilitarians to sup-
port what amount to distinctions in quality, but on quantitative
considerations, and states that it is possible to do more than this.
Furthermore, a subsequent discussion of this issue further develops
just such a position.
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In this discussion, Mill holds that it is perfectly possible
to pursue an end such as virtue or health for its own sake and not
merely as a means to pleasure. Whatever is bo pursued is not then
a means to the utilitarian end because it is, instead, a part of
that end. Money, which is initially desired only as a means to
pleasure, may in time become desired for its own sake and the same
is true of most of the great objects of human life. This argument
is difficult to make clear. However, to say that happiness, as the
only ultimate end, can have parts which are not quantitative but
qualitative merely seems to draw out a special implication of the
initial belief in qualitative differences among pleasures.
Since Mill admits qualitative as well as quantitative differ-
ences, he must have some other technique for determining moral action
as well as measurement of pleasure. There is difference of opinion
as to what this other technique is.
Sidgwiok apparently understands him to mean that the avoidance
of harm to others is the primary specific rule which a utilitarian
should follow. Anschutz, in one of the few even partially definitive
1 A
works on Mill, considers that it is self-realization (defined in
several different ways) that Mill presents as the specific goal of
morality.
Sidgwick*s position (to be considered later) that qualitative
distinctions in pleasure are fatal to utilitarianism seems to me a
valid one. I do not therefore plan to discuss the elements of
14. R. P. Anschutz, The Philosophy of J. S. Mill . PP. 18-19, 22-7.
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self-realization ethics in Mill since these definitely seen to
involve criteria other than pleasure. Concerning the rule about
refraining from harm, Mill does make this a principal part of his
doctrine so far as one's relations with others are concerned, thou^i
it does not give any guidance for purely private morality. In his
work On Liberty we find that*
"The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple prin-
ciple as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society
with the individtial in the way of compulsion and control...
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-"
protection, "*5
Mill states that this principle is not an absolute principle, in
the way that duty ethics would have it, but is grounded on the per-
manent interests of man, that is, on utility.
SECTION 10 . We have now considered the principal elements involved
in the attempts of the two major utilitarians prior to Sldgwick, to
reduce ethics to the greatest happiness principle. It only remains
to comment briefly on the utilitarianism of Herbert Spencer. Spencer,
in his later six-volume work on ethics, does not understand utili-
tarianism exactly as do Bentham and Mill. He does consider it to
mean the greatest happiness of the greatest number but for him greatest
here signifies complete happiness. This will beoome clearer as we
show how he proves utilitarianism.
Like that of Bentham and Mill, Spencer's proof can be said to
be based on psychological hedonism. Spencer does not however claim
15* J. S. Mill, On Liberty , p. 9*
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as do the others, that psychological hedonism is the state of
things right now but rather that it will be, in the perfectly
evolved society of the future. Spencer repeats the observation
of the earlier thinkers that moral conduct is merely a part of
conduct in general and then goes on to say that conduct depends
on the stage of evolution (which is always a progression from
the worse to the better). How we call life good, says Spencer,
only because it is, on the whole pleasurable. Yet in an im-
perfectly evolved society we can only preserve life by encroach-
ing on the life and pleasure of others. We find, however, by
studying what is common to the various aspects of conduct that
the evolutionary tendency is toward a state in which each in-
dividual’s own perfect pleasure will naturally be achieved in
those actions which provide the perfect pleasure of every other
individual. Since this is what will be, it includes what ought
to be, says Spencer.
Utilitarianism is the only ethical principle that recognizes
natural causation (i.e. evolution) according to Spencer. All
other systems ignore natural right and reduce morality to pure
caprice, nevertheless, the utilitarian end cannot be achieved
directly by the measuring system of Bentham. In the present im-
perfect state of evolution, we can only approximate it by obeying
certain general rules which, although they are based on interest,
have in one case at least, almost the foroe of a duty completely
independent of interest.
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—TIQH 11 * Bentham, Mill and, to a leaser extent, Spencer were
all proponents of the later form of utilitarianism. Sidgwick, as
will be shown, inclined to the earlier form. But there is one very
important respect in which all of these thinkers seem alike. In
their attempts to reduce morality to utilitarianism, none of them
seems willing to clearly discredit more than one of the four dif-
ferent definitions of morality. Bentham, Mill and Spencer explic-
itly denounce the ethics of right. Sidgwick, we shall find,
explicitly denounces the ethics of interest. Beyond this, however,
they do not seem to go.
It is within this context that Sidgwick takes his departure
from the latter form of utilitarianism—particularly that of Mill.
Bentham, Mill and Spencer all understood utilitarianism rather
loosely, as they all anticipated, with more or less confidence, a
time when the pursuit of general happiness would also be the best
way to achieve one’s own. In so doing they seemed to presuppose
a merger of the agathistic and hedonistic good. Sidgwick also
hoped that utilitarianism and egoistic hedonism could be reconciled
but he was far less confident of this.
When they came to prove their rather loosely defined utili-
tarianism, Sidgwick’ s predecessors relied on some variant of
psychological hedonism. Only one of the two forms of psychological
hedonism is applicable to the hedonistic good however, while the
other is applicable only to interest ethics. Consequently, there
seemed to be no clear opposition to interest ethics any more than
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there was to either form of good. Indeed interest seemed to he at
the root of both proofs. For even the empirical form of psycho-
logical hedonism consisted merely of a statement of people's wants.
Sidgwick developed a position almost at the opposite pole
from that of his predecessors. For him, the proof of utilitarianism
was based ultimately on the right although, like them, he also seemed
to accept both forms of the good as well.
Of Sidgwick' s predecessors, Mill and especially Bentham be-
lieved in the measurement of pleasures as a means of achieving the
general happiness. Sidgwick severely critioized the effectiveness
of such a process and tried to re-establish the earlier position
that obedience to duty was the best means of achieving the utili-
tarian end.
CHAPTER IV
SIDGWICK' S PROOF OF UTILITARIANISM - NEGATIVE ASPECTS
SECTION 1 . I have considered two of the major and one of the minor
exponents of the later utilitarianism. In my exposition of their
arguments I have already suggested oertain criticisms of them. It
should he noted, however, that no one of these three men was a
philosopher by profession and the two major exponents, at least,
were almost more concerned with the practical applications of utili-
tarianism than they were with its theoretical adequacy. When we
oome to Sidgwiok, the situation is different.
Educated at Cambridge University, Sidgwick spent virtually
the rest of his life there, first as an instructor in classics,
then later as a professor of philosophy. In the very first years
of teaching, immediately after completing his formal education, he
began a study of J. S. Mill, and his first adherenoe to any definite
ethical system was to Mill's utilitarianism. But Sidgwick was, as
he himself explicitly stated, deeply concerned with the theoretical
problems of ethics generally and consequently with those of any
system to whioh he adhered.
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Illustrative of Sidgwiok' s concern for theoretical problems
are the two somewhat different purposes whioh he gives for his
ethical thought. One of these is to make an impartial investi-
gation of all the really distinct moral systems. This is the
avowed purpose of the work The Methods of Ethics
1
in which his
thought is developed. The second purpose is to reduce morality
to utilitarianism. This is the purpose probably credited to him
most often and is what he seems to indicate in his own descrip-
tion of the development of his thought.
An explicit statement of the first purpose is found in the
preface of the first edition and is amplified in the first chapter
of the work. Sidgwiok states in the preface that the purpose of
the Methods is primarily the exposition of the various existing
systems of morality—not a reduction to any particular one of them.
MIt claims to be an examination, at once expository and crit-
ical, of the different methods of obtaining reasoned con-
victions as to what ought to be done whioh are to be found
—
either explicit or implicit—in the moral consciousness of
mankind generallyt and which from time to time, have been
developed. . . by individual thinkers . .
.
Sidgwiok goes on, in Chapter 1, to say that the purpose of
this exposition is to reveal, in a purely disinterested manner,
the difficulties of each of these methods.
1. The Methods of Ethics was Sidgwiok' s first major work and was
first published in 1874* It represents generally the position he
retained throughout his life. He revised this work four times—the
second through the fifth editions—and was in the prooess of revising
the sixth (l^Ol) at the time of his death. It is generally held that
the revisions did not substantially alter the arguments of the work.
Consequently, my study is based almost exclusively on the sixth edition
and quotations are from that edition.
2. The Methods of Ethics , p. 4*
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ethical treatises. . .there has been a continual tendency
to ignore and keep out of sight the difficulties of the sub-
ject; either unconsciously... or consciously that he [the
writerj may not shake the sway of morality over the minds
of his readers. This last well-meant precaution frequently
defeats itself j the difficulties thus concealed in exposi-
tion are likely to reappear in controversy; and then they
appear not carefully limited, but magnified for polemical
purposes... To eliminate or reduce this indefiniteness and
confusion is the sole immediate end that I have proposed to
myself in the present work. In order better to execute this
task, I have refrained from expressly attempting any such
complete and final solution of the chief ethical difficulties
and controversies as would convert this exposition of various
methods into the development of a harmonious system. At the
same time I hope to afford aid to the construction of such a
system. • ."2
Perhaps the strongest explicit statement of this first purpose
is found in the preface to the second edition where Sidgwick makes
the following remark*
"I find that more than one critic has overlooked or disregarded
the account of the plan of my treatise. . .and has consequently
supposed me to be writing as an assailant of two of the methods
I chiefly examine, and a defender of the third... I am con-
cerned to have caused so much misdirection of criticism. "4
Despite these explicit statements of a primary concern to ex-
pose various systems rather than to reduce them to a single one,
Sidgwick indicates, at other places, great concern with this second
purpose. The preface to the sixth edition contains a description
of the development of his thought. In this he indicates how he
came to believe that duty ethics was implicitly utilitarian but
"slowly and reluctantly" concluded that utilitarianism and egoistic
hedonism could not be reconciled. In the conclusion of the Methods
3* Ibid. , p. 3*
4. Ibid., p. x.
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he states that he has -failed" to provide a harmonious system.
These two statements, among others, seem a hit strong if the pro-
duction of a harmonious system was only incidental to his main
purpose in the first place.
The strongest indication of Sidgwiok'e second puri)Ose is,
however, not something he himself explicitly says. The fact is
that he does not impartially consider all the really distinct moral
systems and he does believe that he has reduced two of those which
he does consider to each other. These points will he amplified
subsequently.
oidgwick f s two purposes may be said to make up a more general
purpo8e—hopefully to reduce morality to utilitarianism but to do
so with complete fairness and thus without having to discredit, or
deny the distinctiveness of, all other moral systems.
SECTION 2 . The very organization of his work, and its title, re-
flect Sidgwick* s general purpose although they, perhaps, cause a
little confusion. For example, it may seem strange to write a book
on "methods" of ethics rather than on duties or the good. Aotually,
this term "methods" and its plural use indicates Sidgwick's desire
for fairness to all distinct moral systems. He uses the term in
two senses~a wider and a narrower one (though he does not explic-
itly describe them so).
The wider method determines which narrower method or methods
of ethics are correct . Now two of the narrower methods which
Sidgwick recognizes are what I have called definitions of morality.
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Por Sidgwick, however, they are different narrower methods based
on the same definition. He distinguishes between the right and
the good but not as different definitions of morality—merely as
different narrower methods based on a single definition—which
turns out to be the right again. Consequently there is only one
wider method and this is intuition.^
To understand the meaning of Sidgwick* a narrower method, we
must realize that no matter whether a moral standard applies to
acts or consequences, it is always the morality of the aot with
which we are ultimately concerned. Sidgwick* s narrower method
means, roughly, how we determine the moral act. As noted above
the narrower method is conceived almost as what I would call the
definition itself , since a definition of morality is basically a
statement as to how the morality of the act is determined. (Again
I note that Sidgwick himself does not consider his different methods
to be different definitions.)
If morality is the right, then the moral act is determined by
the "method” of direct intuition. If morality is the good, then
the moral act is determined by the "method” of evaluating conse-
quences. This way of describing different systems (definitions)
gives, in effect, a practical focus to the difficulties of them
—
namely, their workability.
A primary concern with the narrower method is indicated by
the organization of Sidgwick *s work and the plural form of the word
5. Much of this chapter and the following will be devoted to
amplifying these points.
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method used in the title. Indeed, more than half of the 500 pages
are devoted to this practical focus. Nevertheless, his discussion
of the validity of these narrower methods, while briefer, is of
equal importance, (in subsequent discussion I shall, for simplicity,
refer to the narrower methods merely as methods.)
Like Bentham and Mill, Sidgwick does not, in effect, clearly
discredit all the definitions of morality other than that on which
utilitarianism is based. On the contrary, while his predecessors
did not openly admit that the three definitions they retained might
be distinct from and opposed to each other, Sidgwick (though not
considering them definitions) does admit this with respeot to two
of the three but not the third. He clearly opposes what I have
called interest ethics. He does, however, recognize both the right
and the good but does not clearly distinguish between the hedonistic
(in the strict sense of the term) and the agathistic good.
The distinction between the right and the good accounts roughly
for two of the three methods Sidgwick discusses in his work. How-
ever, he does not consider the good so broadly as is possible but
considers it as pleasure alone, whereas there could be other goods,
such as beauty, wisdom, health, etc.
Having claimed that pleasure is the only good^, Sidgwick goes
on to distinguish sharply between egoistic hedonism and utilitari-
anism. At first glance, this distinction would seem to indicate
a distinction between the agathistic and the hedonistic good. This
6. Sidgwick* 8 basis for this claim will be discussed in the next
chapter of this thesis.
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is not so for Sidgwick. He claims that even egoistic hedonism is
ultimately based on an intuition and not on self interest. In
other words, a person ought to pursue the satisfaction of his wants
as a matter of duty and regardless of whether or not he wants to.
This apparently complete denial of the hedonistic good is, however,
only apparent as subsequent discussion will attempt to show. The
only point I am making here is that Sidgwick's distinction between
egoistic hedonism and utilitarianism does not indicate a clear
explicit distinction between the agathistic and the hedonistic good.
Sidgwick's distinctions between the right and the good, and
between egoism and utilitarianism as the only valid goods, are the
basis for the organization of his work. Accordingly, the Methods
of Ethics is divided into four "books"^, the first dealing with
introductory matter and the other three with the three methods he
has distinguished. Book I is an Introduction . Book II concerns
The Method of Egoism . Book III concerns the right but, since
Sidgwick speaks of different methods for determining the moral act,
he prefers to call this a method
—
The Method of Intuitionism. Book
IV concerns The Method of Utilitarianism .
SECTION 3 . The reader would expect that one of the principal
functions of Sidgwick's introductory book would be that of estab-
lishing that there are three different methods of ethics and that
there are no others. Actually, however, most of the justification
7. The Methods of Ethics is a single volume work. The term "book"
here is equivalent in function to the term "part”.
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for distinguishing these three methods and no others is contained
within the separate discussions of the methods which are thus
justified. It is true that there is, in the introductory hook, a
short 12-page chapter explicitly devoted to the question of the
number of truly distinct methods. There are also certain other
9passages in Book I that have to do with this question. But very
important aspects are referred to, and more extensively discussed
in Books III and IV.
There are four propositions involved in Sidgwick’s attempt to
establish his three methods. These ares
1. Interest is by no means a method of ethics.
2. The right and the good constitute two really distinct
methods of ethics.
5. The good is only pleasure.
4» Egoism and utilitarianism are also really distinct methods
of ethics—as distinct from each other as egoism is from
the right.
Proposition 1 . The first proposition is the only one of the
four which is established primarily In Book I. It is however of
very great importance as it constitutes the principal negative
aspect of Sidgwick's proof of utilitarianism. Interest is the only
definition of morality that Sidgwick explicitly denies, just as the
right is the only definition that Bentham and Mill explicitly deny.
8. Chapter VI, entitled "Ethical Principles and Methods"
9. Especially in Chapter VII but also in Chapters I and VIII.
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The latter part of this chapter is devoted to Sidgwick ’s negative
aspect of proof. It shows how Sidgwick refutes the position of
Bentham and Mill that utilitarianism is ultimately based on a
natural self-interest. Before proceeding to these points, I want
to indicate the extent to which Sidgwick does develop the other
three propositions in Book I and further, to mention where in the
later books the more thorough discussions of them are found.
f^pj>Q8ition 2. Early in Chapter I of Book I Sidgwick states,
as a matter of common observation, that the ri#it and the good are
two distinct methods of ethics and in a later chapter of this book
he more or less reiterates this position.
10
In Chapter XIII of
Book III however, be claims to have established these two methods
by his "wider" method (which is a "wider" form of the right). Thus
Sidgwick eventually reaches the conclusion that the distinctiveness
of the right and the good have firmer bases than that of common
acceptance and that these bases are intuitions.
Proposition 5 . With respect to the third proposition,
Sidgwick does not initially claim that the good is only pleasure.
He admits the existence of one other good which he calls perfection
of the moral agent. But, says he, the only way we can know what
constitutes perfection is by an intuition and therefore, perfection
is not a good but a right or duty.
11
I note here as a matter of
clarity that this argument seems to involve a denial of the agathistio
10. The Methods of Ethioa , pp. 2-3, 7&,
11. Ibid., pp. 83-4*
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good. For the agathistic good is an intuition that has made itself
a good by its "appeal" to the moral agent. Sidgwick, however, seems
to be implying here that what the good is cannot be established by
an intuition.
This argument, which recognizes only two goods—pleasure and
perfection—and then claims that perfection is not a good but a
form of right is very brief. It occupies only a few passages in
Chapter VI of Book I. In contrast, the entire last chapter of
Book III is also devoted, in effect, to establishing that the good
is only pleasure; but the argument there is different. In that
chapter Sidgwick claims that the only way one can know what the
good is is by an intuition and that we know by intuition that the
good is only pleasure.
Proposition 4 . The proposition that egoism and utilitarianism
are also clearly distinot methods of ethics remains to be con-
12
sidered. Sidgwick explicitly postpones the proof of this propo-
sition until later in the work. As it happens, not until the third
chapter of the last book are the arguments clearly given (though
they are alluded to in the previous book). Sidgwick claims, there,
that the right (the narrower right) is instinctively utilitarian
—
that utilitarianism is the form into which the right tends to pass.
Consequently the distinction between utilitarianism and egoism
virtually amounts to the distinction between the right and the good.
These four propositions, which I have briefly discussed here,
12. Ibid., pp. 84-5 .
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are central to Sidgwick’s thought and will be more thoroughly con-
sidered in subsequent sections of this and the next two chapters
of this thesis. Due to the apparent circularity of the proofs
(they provide the basis for the classification on which they are
in turn based) it was necessary, for clarity, to review them at
this time.
I have now reached the point at which to begin the main expo-
sition of Sidgwick’s own thought. The purpose of this exposition
is to reveal the problems Sidgwick encounters in his attempt to
reduce morality to utilitarianism. There are three sorts of
problems!
a. The problems which he recognizes in the utilitarianism of
his predecessors, Bentham and Mill.
b. The problems which he recognizes in his own utilitarian-
ism.
o. The problems in his own utilitarianism which he encounters
but does not seem to fully recognize.
The problems which Sidgwick recognizes in the utilitarianism
of Bentham and Mill are a part of the negative aspect of his own
proof of utilitarianism. For his proof is almost directly opposite
to that of his predecessors. These problems are discussed in the
latter part of this chapter.
The problems which Sidgwick encounters in his own proof of
utilitarianism are discussed in Chapters V and VI of the thesis.
Those chapters also indicate the solutions with which he seems to
be satisfied
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Ther® are oertain logioal problems which Sidgwiok failed to
recognize in the solutions he offered. These are discussed in
the seventh and concluding chapter of the thesis.
SECTION 4 . In an early and very important chapter of his work ,
15
Sidgwick explicitly denied that morality could be defined as in-
terest. In doing so, he adopted a position almost exactly opposite
that of his predecessors, Bentham and Mill. Althougi neither of
these latter men showed a clear preference for any single one of
the possible moral definitions, many of their statements support
an interest ethics. Bentham claimed that the only ends men in fact
sought were pleasure and avoidance of pain and these ends were,
accordingly, the only ones which they ought to seek. The apparent
assumption that what is includes what ought to be was later made
explicit by Mill, who argued that the only proof a thing was desir-
able (worth desiring) was that it was in fact desired. A pure in-
terest ethics is not, however, the same as an ethios of good and
it is an ethics of good upon which utilitarianism must be based.
Observing the tendency toward an interest ethics on the part
of Bentham and Mill, Sidgwick argues that if the pursuit of the
utilitarian end is, as they say, a matter of obligation—a good
—
then this end must itself be ultimate and not dependent on inter-
est. For the right cannot be reduced to interest. (Sidgwick
refers to morality as the "right" here.) In support of his state-
ment he examines four variants of this reduction. According to
15. Book I, Chapter III. "Ethical Judgements"
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the first, right means what an individual approves hut, says
Sidgwick, if this is so, then there should he no arguments over
rigiit or wrong. Yet such arguments are commonplace. The second
variant holds that right is what an individual approves in accord
with others. But an individual can cease to he in accord with
others. The objection to the first argument would then he appli-
cable here too. Right may however refer to public opinion apart
from individual feeling, hut we admit that some things are right
to do though they are disapproved by the public. The final varient—
that right is what God approves—is inapplicable to people who do
not believe in divine retribution and the others expect retribution
because the actions are independently good or bad.
From his examination, Sidgwick concluded that the notion of
right is logically simple and cannot be analyzed. It may have been
initially derived from interest as some thinkers (such as Mill)
hold, but that does not mean it is reducible to interest now.
It should be noted that the arguments against interest ethics
which are presented here are different from that presented in
Chapter I of this thesis. The argument of Chapter I was that the
definition of morality as interest makes moral statements meaning-
less—i.e. mere tautologies. Sidgwick does mention this difficulty
but very briefly in a later chapter and as if it were so obvious as
to soaroely even merit recognition as an argument.
The arguments given above are Sidgwick’ s principal arguments
against interest and occupy the chapter in which he explicitly
claims to be discussing the definition of morality. These four
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arguments reduce generally to this-that right cannot be equivalent
to interest since individuals disagree about what is right but they
do not disagree about the mere fact of their different wants. This
argument is very similar to that used by Bentham and Mill to sup-
port a virtually opposite position. For them, the disagreements
of individuals about what is right are evidence that all so-called
duties are arbitrary, and both men seem to conclude, at certain
points in their works, that the right is equivalent to interest.
For Sidgwick, however, these arguments show that the source of the
moral standard is intuition and not interest.
The concept of the good, on which utilitarianism is based,
seems to combine in some way both interest and independent values.
Bentham and Mill accept interest but do not recognize a need for
truly independent values. The desire for a thing can by itself
make that thing independently valuable, Bays Mill. Moreover, both
Mill and Bentham seem to hold that forcing a person to pursue some-
thing can make that thing independently valuable. Sanctions are
sources of obligatory power. Sidgwick, on the contrary, accepts
the independent values but does not recognize a need for interest.
He argues that recognition of a "reasonable end" (by which he seems
to mean an intuitively moral one) itself virtually provides the
"impulse” to aotion. The adoption of an end is not a matter of
interest but one of volition.
SECTION 5 . Sidgwick, as we see, criticizes the tendency character-
istic of his two predecessors to define morality as interest. He
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also criticizes their further position that the only object in which
man in fact has an interest is happiness. 14 it will he recalled
that this latter position is called psychological hedonism.
I indicated in the previous chapter that there are two forms
of psychological hedonism~the logical and the empirical—and that
neither Mill nor Bentham make clear which form they use. Of the two
forms the logical form is tautological. What this means is that it
is, in a strict sense, not hedonistic at all hut is closer to inter-
est ethics. It claims that what you want to get is what you want
to get. Hedonism, however, claims that what you want to get is the
satisfaction of your want. Only empirical psychological hedonism
could establish this. Sidgwick, however, shows, using the famous
argument of Butler and Hume, that the empirical form is logioally
impossible.
Sidgwick first observes that psychological hedonism is often
used to support egoistic hedonism but that even if psychological
hedonism is true, it does not necessarily provide such support. It
may simply be that whatever people recognize as their duty is in
fact what they enjoy doing, and not that this enjoyment is itself
what they ought to seek. Of course, if instead of defining psycho-
logical hedonism in terms of pleasure alone we define it in terms
of greatest pleasure, then obviously a man who by nature can seek
only greatest pleasure, cannot by obligation seek anything else.
In this case however obligation becomes meaningless.
14. Book I, Chapter IV. “Pleasure and Desire*’.
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But is psychological hedonism true? Sidgwick observes that
Hill’s equating of pleasure and desire may; lead to the logical, but
tautological, form of psychological hedonism. He concludes, however,
that we must understand Mill to be, in reality, talking about the
empirical form when he says that psychological hedonism is so obvi-
ous as to hardly be disputed. Then he brings forward Butler’s
argument that there must necessarily be desires other than for
pleasure. This earlier English moralist holds that there are "par-
ticular movements" to external objects, suoh as honor, power, etc.,
which can be said to be interested only in the sense that every
movement of a creature is interested. These movements are presup-
posed by the idea of a pursuit of interest. Sidgwick, summarizing
the argument, states that "we could not pursue pleasure at all,
unless we had desires for something else than pleasure; for pleasure
consists in the satisfaction of just these ’disinterested’ impulses."
1 ^
Now this argument, which we have previously considered in
Chapter II, seems to be simply a variant of the logical criticism
of the hedonistic good. It appears therefore to have logical cogency
—
that is it appears as convincing as the statement "if equals are
added to equals the results are equal”. Sidgwick tends to interpret
its cogency as a product of empirical investigation and not therefore
absolute.
"Butler has certainly over-stated his case, so far as my own
experience goes; for many pleasures. . .occur to me without any
perceptible relation to previous desires, and it seems quite
15. The Methods of Ethics , p. 44 *
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£uncelvable that our primary desires might he entirely
directed to such pleasures as these. But as a matter of
f
^ct » appears to me that... I can distinguish desires of,,which the object is something other than my own pleasure.*'16
Having chosen to rest his case on empirical findings, Sidgwick
gives a number of examples. Hunger, according to his observation,
is a direct impulse and one example of a primary desire. In this
case, the secondary desire for satisfaction may seem somewhat diffi-
cult to distinguish from the primary one. However, if we consider
the pleasure we get not purely from attaining something, as is the
case with hunger, but mainly from the pursuit of it, then it is
clear that we do first pursue it. Once we are pursuing it, we be-
come interested in it, and may at that point desire the pleasure of
attaining it.
In the case of pleasures of pursuit, the distinction between
these primary and secondary desires (or as Sidgwick prefers to call
them—extra-regarding and self-regarding impulses) is further
accentuated by the fact that they tend to conflict with each other.
MA man who maintains throughout an epicurean mood, keeping
his main conscious aim perpetually fixed on his own pleasure,
does not catch the full spirit of the chase... Here comes
into view the fundamental paradox of Hedonism, that the , ^
impulse of pleasure if too predominant, defeats its own aim." 1
Nevertheless, says Sidgwick, the conflict between the two kinds
of impulses is not absolute and man's greatest happiness, if this
be his goal, is usually attained by a sort of alternating rhythm of
the two, Sidgwiok concludes that we certainly do not always have
16. Ibid., pp. 44-5*
17. Ibid., p. 48.
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impulses toward pleasure. Psychological hedonism is false. We do
however sometimes have impulses toward pleasure. The possibility
remains of validating both egoism and utilitarianism provided that
some better means can be found for doing so. In the next chapter
we shall consider Sidgwiok’s reliance upon intuition for this
purpose.
SECTION 6. Having presented his arguments against psychological
hedonism, Sidgwick, much later in his work‘d
, suggests that even
if it were true, it would not necessarily support utilitarianism.
He pays special attention to one of Mill's arguments. Mill had
held that*
a. The individual can desire only his own happiness.
b. The happiness of the aggregate of individuals therefore
ought to be desired.
c. The individual ought, therefore, to desire the aggregate
happiness,
Sidgwick remarks, of this proof that:
"...an aggregate of actual desires, each directed towards a
different part of the general happiness, does not constitute
an actual desire for the general happiness, existing in any
individual; and Mill would certainly not contend that a
desire whioh does not exist in any individual can possibly
exist in an aggregate of individuals. There being therefore
no actual desire for the general happiness, the proposition
that the general happiness is desirable cannot be in this
way established. .
.
Sidgwick* 8 argument here seems quite convincing but it must
18. Book III, Chapter XIII.
19. Ibid., p. 588.
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be remembered that Mill and Bentham share another position con-
nected with proof of utilitarianism. Both men seem to feel that
the pursuit of general happiness tends to be or can be made to be
the best way to achieve one's own. If this statement is true then
it does seem that the acceptance of psychological hedonism neces-
sarily involves the acceptance of utilitarianism. Sidgwick, how-
ever, questions the statement's truth. He observes that nowhere
in Bentham' a own works does he give a complete answer as to how
this reconciliation of utilitarianism and egoistic hedonism ooours.
Neither he says, does Mill show how individuals will achieve even
the best ohance at their own happiness in this life by pursuing the
utilitarian goal. Sidgwick thus finds difficulties with both argu-
ments by which his predecessors sought to connect utilitarianism
with psychological hedonism; and this is in addition to his view
that psychological hedonism is not valid in the first place.
20
One final point I will mention here is Sidgwick' s criticism
of Mill '8 view that there are qualitative differences among pleas-
21
ures. Sidgwick* s criticism is very brief. He simply points out
I
that qualitative distinctions would have to be made on the basis
of criteria other than pleasure but for hedonism there can be no
such criteria. If pleasure is the only ultimate end then the




Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers . The
comments are found in his exposition of Bentham and Mill, pp. 232-
236 .
21. The Methods of Sthios . pp. 120-121, 128-131; Outlines of the
History of Ethics for English Headers , p. 236.
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resuits of an act cannot be measured, in any way other than by
pleasure.
SECTION^. When Sidgwick criticizes his utilitarian predecessors
there are at least two difficulties which he seems to miss. The
first difficulty is the lack of a clear statement by Bentham and
Mill as to which form of psychological hedonism they are using to
prove utilitarianism. Sidgwick states, with respect to Mill, that
we must assume Mill to use the empirical form, since the other form
is tautologous. However, I am not sure that we can, with fairness
to Mill, make this assumption. It may be that Mill (and Bentham
too) vaguely hoped to have the best of both forms—the certainty
of the logical form with the meaningfulness of the empirical one.
The second difficulty is Mill's apparently ambiguous use of
the word desirable in his argument that the only proof that a thing
is desirable is that it is desired. If desirable simply means
desired then this argument is true but tautologous. If desirable
means worthy of desire then the argument is significant but not
necessarily true. Only if the word is used ambiguously can there
even be an appearance that the argument is successful. Sidgwick
claims, in later editions of the Methods to have noted this ambi-
guity and yet he himself seems to employ it at a critical point in
the development of his own position. Having completed the dis-
cussion of Sidgwick' s negative aspects of proof, I shall now turn
to an exposition of that position.
CHAPTER V
THE VALIDITY OP UTILITARIANISM
SECTION 1 . Although the very organization of Sidgwick' a work and
the proportion of it which is devoted to questions of workability
suggest a major emphasis on this faotor, Sidgwick is also con-
cerned to show the validity of his "methods” • The primary chapters
in which he attempts this (Chapters XIII and XIV of Book III)
occupy only 34 out of the 500 pages in the work but are of much
greater importance than their proportion to the whole would indicate.
The starting point for Sidgwick' e own proof of the validity
of utilitarianism is his criticism in Book I of the proofs of
Bentham and Mill. He argued, against their psychological hedonism,
that what is could not be a proof of what ought to be and, further-
more, pursuit of pleasure was not the only thing that existed, any-
way. As against his predecessors, Sidgwick claims that any real
obligation must be based on an intuition even when this obligation
is considered an end to be pursued (the good) rather than a duty
to be obeyed (the right). In neither case can obligation be de-
rived from mere observation of facts. I note, however, that
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intuition and the right are virtually equivalent and are
so used by Sidgwick. The right is determined only by intuitions
and moral intuitions always establish some right, whether that
right happens to be that one ought to perform a duty or ought to
seek an end. In either case it means that one ought to do some-
thing regardless of interest or consequences, though what one
ought to do may itself involve consideration of consequences. Now
Sidgwick recognizes, as we mentioned, that there is a distinction
between the right and the good and accordingly he goes on to recog-
nize a need for a "wider right" (wider intuitionism) as a means of
establishing the intuitive certainty of the good.
In a very important passage of Book I, Sidgwick sets forth
this position. He first remarks:
"I have used the term 'Intuitional* to denote the view of
ethics which regards as the practically ultimate end of
moral actions their conformity to certain rules or dictates
of ])uty unconditionally prescribed.
He then goes on to state that, while this view of ethics is
often thought to ignore consequences altogether, there is no ethics
which does not consider consequences to some extent—for there is
no clear point at which an act ends and consequences begin. This
intuitional view, according to Sidgwick, is that only the Immediate
results of an act are to be considered.
"But again:", continues Sidgwick, "we have to observe that
men may and do judge remote as well as immediate results to
be in themselves good, and such as we ought to seek to realize,
without considering them in relation to the feelings of sentient
1 . The Methods of Ethics , p. 96 .
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beings... We have therefore to admit a wider use of ’Intuition'
as equivalent to immediate judgement as to what ought to be
done or aimed at.”
2
If hedonism is presented as an obligatory end, then it, like
all other goods, must derive from one of these wider intuitions.
"If Hedonism claims to give authoritative guidance, this can
only be in virtue of the principle that pleasure is the only
reasonable ultimate end of human action* and this principle
cannot be known by induction from experience. Experience can
at most tell us that all men always do seek pleasure as their
ultimate end (that it does not support this conclusion I have
already tried to show)* it cannot tell us that anyone ought
so to seek it. If this latter proposition is legitimately
affirmed in respect either of private or of general happiness,
it must either be immediately known to be true,—and therefore,
we may say, a moral intuition—or be inferred ultimately from
premises which include at least one such moral intuition;
hence either species of Hedonism, regarded from the point of
view primarily taken in this treatise, might be legitimately
said to be in a certain sense ’intuitional' .”5
Sldgwick reiterates his distinction between the wider and
narrower intuitionism in Book III.
”...in such maxims as that. . .justice should be done ’though
the sky should fall’, it is implied that we have the power of
seeing clearly that certain kinds of actions are right and
reasonable in themselves, apart from their consequences ;—or
rather with a merely partial consideration of consequences...
And such a power is claimed for the human mind by most of the
writers who have maintained the existence of moral intuitions;
I have therefore thought myself justified in treating this
claim as characteristic of the method which I distinguish as
intuitional. At the same time... there is a wider sense in
which the term ’intuitional’ might be legitimately applied to
either Egoistic or Universalistic Hedonism; so far as either
system lays down as a first principle—which if known at all
must be intuitively known—that happiness is the only rational
ultimate end of action. ”4
2. Ibid., p. 97*
3. Ibid., p. 98*
4. Ibid., pp. 200-201.
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Restated briefly, Sidgwick's position is that no hedonist
(nor a proponent of any other good) can be completely opposed to
an ethics of right since he relies upon it to establish that happi-
ness (or wisdom, beauty, etc.) is the ultimate end. He does not
consider happiness to be a means to some even further end—this
ultimate end is unconditional and not dependent on consequences.
One would expect that the sole function of the "wider intui-
tionism" would be to establish the validity of various specific
goods. In fact, however, Sidgwick uses it to establish what almost
amounts to the general validity of the good itself. He also uses
it to establish the validity of the narrower intuitionism. The
narrower intuition he otherwise refers to in terms of "ordinary
intuitions" or "the morality of common sense", while the wider he
considers to involve "philosophical intuitions". By means of philo-
sophical intuitions he claims to have established not merely var-
ious specific goods but the validity of all three of his methods
of ethics including utilitarianism.
SECTION 2 . In accordance with his emphasis upon workability,
Sidgwick devotes most of his third book (on intuitionism) to a
discussion of what he considers practical difficulties of the nar-
rower intuitionism. While his discussion of the workability of
the two other methods is considered in the next chapter of this
thesis, it is important to immediately review the remarks on nar-
rower intuitions. For these give perspective to the wider philo-
sophical intuitions which he distinguishes in the last part of the
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same book and upon which the various methods are based. At the
outset of this review I must mention a peculiarity in Sidgwick’
s
very understanding of duty ethics. There is, for him, a third
type of intuitionism in addition to ordinary intuitionism and
philosophical intuitionism. This third type is ultra intuition-
ism. Ultra intuitions apply to absolutely speoific circumstances
and do not involve any reasoning process at all."* On the other
hand, ordinary intuitions—what we usually call duty ethics— are
statements of general rules (always tell the truth, always keep
promises, etc.). As such they involve a process of reasoning to
determine whether the rules apply in any given case.
^
This distinction between general intuitions and absolutely
specific ones may be connected with another position of Sidgwick’ s.
He maintains, as previously mentioned, that a duty ethics cannot
completely ignore consequences since there is no clear point at
which an act ends and consequences begin. When I introduced this
point in Chapter I, I suggested that the delineation of an act from
its consequences must itself be by an intuition if a duty ethics is
to be retained. This, however, is not exactly the position which
Sidgwick. takes. He claims that rules of duty do not apply to the
act as such but either to the "motive" of the act or its "intention".
The intention of an act involves, for Sidgwick, all foreseen conse-
quences. The motive of the act also involves some consequences but
5* Ibid., Book I, Chapter VIII, Section 2.
6. Ibid., Book I, Chapter VIII, Section 3*
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onljr those which are -desired".
7
it seems rather unusual to re-
quire that a duty ethios consider all foreseen consequences when
even an ethics of the good could scarcely hope to do more than
this. Yet Sidgwick, over the course of his argument, considers
the workability of duty ethics as being applied to one or the
other of these two alternatives (motives or intentions) and he
himself considers that intentions are the most proper objects of
rules of duty. Given the somewhat unusual object to which Sidgwick
claims that rules of duty apply, what does he do in the analysis
of these rules? He attempts to discover among the commonly ac-
cepted duties some which have the cogency of scientific axioms. He
requires, among other things, that any such maxims should be truly
self evident and not conflicting with each other. Three general
categories of duties are considered. Duties which involve the
affections are called duties of Benevolence. ^ If we consider spe-
cific services, such as those which Benevolence requires, in terms
of their distribution, we discover the duties of Justice.^ For
these prescribe how such services are to be distributed. One
criterion of just acts is that they do not run counter to normal
expectations. This is the most definite criterion and is indeed
the basis for a third major category of duties—that of Laws and
7. Ibid., Book III, Chapter X, Section 2.
8. There are several other categories but by far the most attention
is given to these three.
9. The Methods of Ethics , Book III, Chapter IV.
10.




From his rather extensive analysis (over 100 pages)
of these three categories and some others, Sidgwick draws virtually
the same conclusions about duty ethics as had Mill and Bentham (the
latter two with far more brevity). There is no agreement among
people as to what constitutes duty and, accordingly, no clearly
12
self evident duties (at least of the narrower sort).
The nature of Sidgwick 1 s argument is to develop various sub-
categories of his main duties and then give, for each, examples of
the common disagreements on specific duties. For my purposes it
would be tedious and unnecessary to present these arguments in
detail. I shall merely demonstrate his procedure by some examples.
In the case of duties of Benevolence, some people hold that
children should obey their parents as to choice of mate and pro-
fession. Others say that they have no such obligation. Again there
are those who hold that parents should sacrifice domestic to public
good while others hold the contrary. Some say marriage should,
without exception, be permanent. Others hold that there may be
exceptions. One group holds that gratitude should be given in pro-
portion to services rendered. Another claims that it should be
given in proportion to the effort of the benefactor.
Similar disagreements are found in the case of duties of
Justice. One criterion of just acts is that they fulfill expecta-
tions. But there is disagreement as to whether tacit expectations
11. Ibid., Book III, Chapter VI.
12. Ibid., Book III, Chapter XI entitled "Review of the Morality
of Common Sense”.
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sliould be fulfilled or only explicit ones. Moreover, the defi-
nition of expectations depends on customs and customs vary.
Some people hold that freedom is the only principle of
Justice. All aots are just except those which interfere with
someone else’s freedom. It is not clear however to whom the prin-
ciple of freedom applies since it cannot apply absolutely. It
cannot apply to children, idiots, or for some, even to a lower
stage of adult civilization. Furthermore, the principle itself
cannot be absolute since, in the pure sense, it allows any amount
of annoyance except actual constraint. To what extent does it
apply? Does the principle apply to property, for example? In a
world of limited goods, the holding of property is interference.
Another view of justice is that it involves the general re-
warding of valuable deeds j but there is no really adequate way to
determine the value of a deed. Market value doe3 not seem adequate
as a basis for justice and the adoption of a socialistic ideal begs
the question.
These, then, are some examples of the considerations from which
Sidgwick concludes that there is no agreement about what in fact are
duties.
^
There are two points about Sidgwick* s argument that might be
mentioned here. Firstly, this argument results in Idle same sort of
13. It would seem that the nature of Sidgwick* s argument, if not
its precision, could be readily duplicated. All that is involved
is to observe the avowed moral tenets of a few different religions,
governments, civilizations, etc. Numerous disagreements—even
about such basic questions as the definition of murder, will be
almost immediately evident.
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apparently empirical rather than logical objection to duty ethics
which Mill and Bentham raised. It does not seem logically neces-
sary that what is a duty for one person must be so for another,
though disagreements on duties may create practical difficulties
if one person’s pursuit of hie duty interferes with another’s
pursuit of his. There is a logical difficulty of duty ethics but
that is its apparent denial of , and at the same time dependence
upon, free will. Sidgwick however does not recognize a problem
of free will in this context.
The second point is that, surprisingly, Sidgwick’ a objection
to duty ethics is based on almost the same argument which in Book I
he used as an objection to the opposite of duty ethics—i.e. inter-
est. In both cases the objections rest on the observation that
there are disagreements among people about what their duties are.
SECTION 3 - Although Sidgwick 's argument against duty ethics is
very similar to that of Bentham and Mill, there are two important
differences. In the first place, he suggests that while no rules
of duty (common sense morality, as he calls it) are absolute, they
are nevertheless binding more often than not. ’’...the Morality of
Common Sense may still be perfectly adequate to give practical
14
guidance to common people in common circumstances...” This con-
cession of Sidgwick' s is one which Bentham and Mill would not be
likely to grant.
The second and crucial difference between Sidgwick' s argument
14. The Methods of Ethics , p. 3&1.
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and that of his predecessors is that Sidgwick does not completely
denounce duty ethics. Although none of the narrower ordinary in-
tuitions are axiomatic, there are, for him, some wider philosophical
ones which are. And these wider intuitions provide the proof of
his various methods—among them utilitarianism.
In the pursuit of philosophical intuitions there are two
hazards which must he avoided, says Sidgwick. One of these is to
so concern yourself with a particular aspect of common sense morality
that your very discussion of it is based on an implicit acceptance
of the self same morality. Another hazard, to which the ancient
Greeks succumbed, is the making of sham axioms which are in reality
nothing but tautologies. Plato, for example, held that the good
life consisted in the exeroise of Virtue. As to what conduct was
virtuous, however, he could only say that it was knowledge of the
Good and action in accordance therewith.
If the hazards are avoided, we are capable of arriving at
certain axiomatic intuitions. There are three such intuitions.
SECTION A . One self evident intuition is the maxim of "Justice”.
This maxim may be best stated as follows t "It cannot be right for
A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat
A, merely on the ground that they are two different individuals,
and without there being any difference between the natures or cir-
cumstances of the two whioh can be stated as a reasonable ground
for difference of treatment A simpler statement of the same
15. Ibid., p. 380.
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naxim would be that "...whatever action any of us judges to be right
for himself, he implicitly judges to be right for all similar per-
sons in similar circumstances."
16
This positive statement of the
maxim would, however, permit sin, provided the sinner was willing
for others to do likewise? thus the negative form is more exact.
The maxim of Justice is obtained simply by reflection upon the
general action of rightness as commonly conceived. In physical
science we are forced to accept variations for which no rational
explanation can be discovered. It is generally agreed that this
oannot be permitted in ethical judgments.
SECTION 5 . The maxim of "Prudence" is also axiomatic. It is that
"...Hereafter as suoh is to be regarded neither less nor more than
17
now*" with respect to an individual’s conscious life. It is thus
a principle recommending impartial concern for all parts of one’s
life.
The principle of Justice was derived "...by considering the
similarity of the individuals that make up a Logical Whole or
18
Genus. There axe others, no leas important, which emerge in the
consideration of a Mathematical or Quantitative Whole. Such a Whole
is presented in the common notion of the Good-, of any individual
19
human being." Consequently, we see that no temporal part of the
16. Ibid., p. 379.
17. Ibid., p. 381.
18. By a Logical Whole is meant a qualitative whole—a whole of
qualitatively different parts which should however be considered
on the same value level.
19. The Methods of Ethics , pp. 380-581*
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good of an individual—whatever that good may be—should be pre-
ferred to any other merely on the basis of the time difference
alone.
We may note that Sidgwick i8 discussing absolute rules of
right which, notwithstanding Bentham end Mill, he does believe to
exist—though there are only three of them. Nevertheless he assumes
in the maxim of Prudence and in that of Benevolence to follow that
what is right is to properly distribute the good .
SECTION 6 . The maxim of "Benevolence” maintains that "...eaoh one
is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much
as his own, except in so far as he .judges it to be less, when im-
on
partially viewed, or less oertainly knowable or attainable by him."
While Prudence is concerned with proper temporal distribution,
21
Benevolence is concerned with the spatial distribution.
Regarding the derivation of this maxim, Sidgwick remarks
s
MSo far we have only been considering the ’Good on the Whole’
of a single individual* but just as this notion is constructed
by comparison and integration of the different ’goods' that
succeed one another in the series of our conscious states, so
we have formed the notion of Universal Good by comparison and^g
integration of the goods of all individual human—or sentient
20. Ibid., p. 382.
21. This distinction between spatial and temporal distribution as
a manner of describing Prudence and Benevolence is not, in its exact
terminology, employed by Sidgwick. It is used by Hayward in his book
The Ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick and is found in various places in
that work.
22. Some utilitarians held that the greatest happiness should be
sought only for humans. Others said that all sentient creatures
should be included. Hence the qualification here. The issue does
not seem to be very important philosophically.
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—existences. And here again, just as in the former case, Iobtain the self-evident principle that the good of any one
individual is of no more importance from the point of view...
of the Universe, than the good of any other; unless, that is,
there are special grounds for believing that more good is
likely to be realized in the one case than in the other. And
it is evident to me that X am bound to aim at good generally, .
,
not merely at a particular part of it. From these two rational
intuitions we may deduce as a necessary inference, the maxim
of Benevolence. .
.
In other words, it is evident that the general good does not
repose more in one individual than any other; and it is further
evident that one should seek the general good—thus the maxim of
Benevolence.
^
SECTION 7 . The existence of three self-evident maxims has been
revealed but these belong to the ethics of right, or intuitionism,
in the wider (philosophical) sense, and not M ...in the restricted
sense whioh, for clear distinction of methods, I gave to this term
25
at the outset of our investigation.” J These maxims being both self
evident and of the wider sort are capable of supporting an ethics
of the good as well as of right. Hence we find that the maxim of
Prudence is implied in the commonly accepted method of egoism, the
maxim of Benevolence is implied in the method of utilitarianism,
23* The Methods of Ethics , p. 382.
24 . Sidgwick claims that his confidence in the axiomatic character
of his intuitions is strengthened by the fact that other moralists
have advanced somewhat similar ones. He cites Samuel Clarke’s
'rules of righteousness' and Immanuel Kant's 'categorical imper-
atives' as examples. In the first edition of the Methods Sidgwick
did not present hie maxims as direct intuitions but rather as in-
terpretations of the intuitions of Clarke and Kant.
25* The Methods of Ethios , p. 386.
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£md the maxim of Justice is the basis of intuitionism. The core-
lation between maxims and methods is not quite that simple, however.
For Sidgwick further maintains that the maxim of Justice "...belongs
in all its applications to Utilitarianism as much as to any system
commonly called intuitional."
26
Although there is virtually no
additional argument in this chapter, Sidgwiok maintains a page later
not only that the basis of intuitionism (Justice) applies equally
to Utilitarianism but that "Utilitarianism is thus presented as the
final form into which intuitionism tends to pass, when the demand
for really self-evident first principles is rigorously pressed."
2^
Let us summarize what has been accomplished in this analysis
of the ethics of right~the method of intuitionism. We first ob-
served that there are a narrower and wider meaning and discovered
that the narrower one was indeed subject to the inconsistencies
and incoherence which Bentham and Mill had claimed. This narrower
meaning was furthermore that on which the initial distinction of
methods was based. Intuitionism, in the wider sense and transcending
particular methods, did however provide three self-evident maxims.
These three maxims turned out, as it happened, to be the proof of
the three methods. It was, moreover, discovered that the maxim of
Justice was as applicable to utilitarianism as to the narrower in-
tuitionism and it was then virtually concluded with no further
argument that these two methods were reducible to each other.
26. Ibid., pp. 506-387.
27. Ibid., p. 388.
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We are thus left with two methods—egoism and utilitarianism
(the latter including the narrower intuitionism) . We have then
begun to prove utilitarianism in a somewhat more satisfactory manner
28
than Mill was able to do, according to Sidgvick. But the proof
is not finished. Though a failure, Mill's proof was at least an
attempt to prove utilitarianism alone. Here we have only managed
to reduce ethics to two conflicting principles. Furthermore we
haven't even proved Hedonism since what the good is, which the
maxims of Prudence and Benevolence are to distribute, has not yet
been determined. We shall consider this latter question first and
then discuss the problem of two conflicting principles.
SECTION 8 . Before proceeding to an answer of what it is that is
good, which in the course of his argument is Sidgwick's very next
concern, let us briefly consider how he defines the good, as indicated
29
in an earlier chapter.
We find that just as his conception of the right is a bit un-
usual (rules of duty not only apply to consequences but to all fore-
seen consequences) so, in a sense, is his conception of the good.
He begins with the observation that the good cannot be defined as
pleasure, since we commonly recognize a matter of taste such that
what is pleasant may not be good. Furthermore if the good were
defined as pleasure, then a hedonist who held that what was good
28. In contrasting hie own proof with that of his predecessors,
Sidgwick refers specifically to Mill's position at this point,
though a generally similar contrast could be drawn with Bentham's.
29. The Methods of Ethics , Book I, Chapter IX entitled "Good”
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wae pleasure would merely be stating a tautology. The good can,
however, be defined as a sort of desire. It is not what is desired,
since this might cease to be so when actually acquired (due to
accompanying oonsequences which were not considered). It is what
would be desired given knowledge of all alternatives and consequences.
Thus the good is, in effect, defined as desire accompanied by
perfect knowledge. The peculiar thing about this conception of the
good, and particularly when advanced by Sidgwick, is that it almost
seems to reduce the good to interest. For the qualification that
there be perfect knowledge seems merely to require that the inter-
est be enlightened and enlightened interest far from being at all
different from interest per se is, on the contrary, the purest form
of it. Yet Sidgwick takes great pains, in other parts of his work,
to show that what is good is determined not by interest but by in-
tuition. In view of his two positions he seems to be describing the
good as a goal whioh a thoroughly knowledgeable person would want
as a matter of obligation and regardless of whether or not he wanted
it.
SECTION 9 « Given Sidgwick' s somewhat unusual definition of the
good, what is it that he believes is the good? He examines what in
30
effect are two groups^ of possible answers and finds that neither
of them are tenable.
The first group of answers merely leads you in a logical circle.
30. Sidgwick does not explicitly group these answers but he treats
them similarly.
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Por ®xainple, one answer holds that the good means conformity to
common rules of morality hut these rules are based on the wider
intuitions and these wider intuitions merely tell one to seek the
good. Sidgwiok considers other answers of this sort but, as they
do not seem very controversial and have not generally been questioned
by his critics, they will not be considered here.
The conclusion to the study of the first group is that neither
virtuous character nor conduct can be called the ultimate good since
they presuppose this good. Sidgwick then remarks:
"And what has been said of Virtue seems to be still more mani-
festly true of the other talents, gifts and graces which make
up the common notion of human excellence or perfection. How-
ever immediately the excellent quality of such gifts and
skills may be recognized and admired, reflection shows that
they are only valuable on account of the good or desirable
conscious life in which they are or will be actualized. .
.
Shall we then say that Ultimate Good is Good or Desirable con-
scious or sentient Life—of which Virtuous action is one ele-
ment but not the sole constituent? This seems in harmony with
Common Sense..." 31
In further support of this position, Sj.dgwick notes that we cannot
attribute good to mere preservation—for preservation is considered
good only when accompanied by consciousness—that consciousness
which is, on the whole, desirable rather than undesirable. More-
over, so far as virtuous activity is considered a part of the good,
it is so only because the consciousness accompanying it is desir-
able for the agent. A virtuous life would not be good on the whole
if it involved great pain, says Sidgwick.
Tims we arrive at Sidgwick’ s second group o.f answers which is
31. The Methods of Ethics , pp. 395-396.
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inclusive of all those which would propose as good something in
isolation from "desirable consoious life". But even if it is
granted that only "desirable conscious life" is the good, such a
conclusion is not adequate for utilitarianism. In order to prove
utilitarianism (in its usual meaning) Sidgwick should instead prove
that ultimate good is pleasure . Are desirable consciousness and
pleasure identical? Only if they are has he succeeded. Now there
are, in consciousness, cognitions and volitions as well as feelings.
The desirability of feelings cannot be measured by any other stand-
ard than individual pleasure so here, at least, the two notions are
identical. What of cognitions and volitions? Sidgwick claims that
we will find on reflection that if we distinguish these cognitions
and volitions from the feelings that accompany them and from the
objective relations (such as in cognition prompt us to speak of
truth or falsity) they are neither desirable nor undesirable but
are completely neutral. (I shall consider this matter of objec-
tive relations in the following section.) What is accomplished by
this abstraction of feelings from the cognitions and volitions they
accompany? Briefly stated, Sidgwick’ s argument concerning whether
desirable consciousness and pleasure are identical seems to result
in the following;
a. One element of desirable consciousness—feeling—is
identical with pleasure.
b. The other two elements—cognitions and volitions are
desirable and therefore part of ultimate good only
insofar as they are connected with feelings.
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c. Therefore it is the feeling in these elements that is
part of ultimate good.
d. Therefore desirable consciousness is in all cases identical
with pleasure.
SECTION 10. It has been proved in a negative way (by negation of
the two groups of answers) that ultimate good is desirable conscious-
ness—which means pleasure. Sidgwick now pauses in the development
of his proof and makes a partial retreat. A man may prefer a pain-
ful truth to a comfortable fiction but in this case he is not judg-
ing the conscious state as such but an objective relation. Simi-
larly, a man may prefer painful freedom to comfortable slavery
because he has a predominant aversion to the latter. In these cases
it would seem that there were desires which were not governed by
feeling merely as feeling (i.e. pleasure) but by some objective
standard. If so, then the maxim of Benevolence would not lead to
utilitarianism alone.
But now Sidgwick moves forward to the positive and crucial
proof for pleasure as the sole ultimate good. MI think, however,
that this view ought not to commend itself to the sober judgement
32
of reflective persons.” The positive proof is twofold. ”1
appeal firstly to his the reader's intuitive judgement after due
consideration of the question when fairly placed before it; and
secondly to a comprehensive comparison of the ordinary judgements
32. Ibid., p. 400.
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53of Mankind. n Concerning the first part of the proof, he gives
his own intuitive judgement.
’’Admitting that we have actual experience of such preferences
as have just been described, of which the ultimate object is
something that is not merely consciousness: it still seems to
me that when (to use Butler's phrase) we 'sit down in a cool
hour' we can only justify to ourselves the importance that we
attach to any of these objects by considering its conducive-
ness, in one way or another, to the happiness of sentient
being8."34
It seems then that there are no desires governed by objective
standards. There only appear to be. We also find this to be true
when we consider the second part of the proof—the study of Common
Sense judgements.
"...several cultivated persons do habitually judge that
knowledge, art, etc.—not to speak of Virtue—are ends in-
dependently of the pleasure derived from them. But we may
urge not only that all these elements of 'ideal good’ are
productive of pleasure in various ways; but also that they
seem to obtain the commendation of Common Sense, roughly
speaking, in proportion to the degree of this productive-
ness. "55
In other words, any objective element is valuable roughly in pro-
portion to its pleasantness. The inference seems to be that the
pleasantness is therefore what is valued.
SECTION 11 . Sidgwick has now proved, to his satisfaction, that the
ultimate good is pleasure (or desirable consciousness) and nothing
else. It is pleasure, then, of which the wider intuitions of Prudence
(for egoism) and Benevolence (for utilitarianism) are to prescribe
33. Ibid.




the distribution. Thus we have found that the two methods which
the wider intuitions support are indeed hedonistic.
At this point it is necessary, for the sake of clarity, to
review the somewhat different functions of Sidgwick’s various wider
or philosophical intuitions. We may recall that a primary reason
for distinguishing the wider intuitionism was in order to establish
that any specific good, even though involving consequences, was in
a sense based on a right or duty—the duty to pursue it. The in-
tuition which established that only pleasure is the good is pre-
sumably of this sort. On the other hand, Sidgwick also relies on
philosophical intuitionism to establish his three methods of ethics.
Since the initial determination of these methods was based on the
common distinction between the right and the good, one would sup-
pose that the provision of an intuitive basis for the methods would
also constitute an intuitive basis for the right and the good. So
far as can be seen, this is what Sidgwick intends. (Whether or not
he succeeds in this will he considered in the last chapter.)
Prom this review of Sidgwick’s philosophical intuitions, it is
evident that these intuitions not only provide the proof for the
validity of utilitarianism; they also establish the second and third
of the four propositions by which Sidgwick justifies his delineation
56
of the three methods of ethics. They thus "prove” the validity
of egoism (and in a sense intuitionism) as well.
SECTION 12. How does our proof of utilitarianism compare now with
56. See Chapter IV, Section 5 of this thesis.
that of Mill’ 8? We had first proved an abstract principle of dis-
tribution—not just one, however, but two. At that time we did
not know what was to be distributed. Well, we now have our com-
modity, such as it is, but we are still tom between two principles
of distributing it—utilitarianism and egoism* Can the two be
reconciled? Sidgwick’s answer is no—not at least by any human
efiort. he claims that both egoism and utilitarianism are equally
axiomatic and therefore concludes in the very last chapter of the
work"' that he has not succeeded in providing a rational morality.^
8
For such a morality oannot be based on two different "methods".
'i'he postulation of a god who reconciles these two methods to each
other would resolve this difficulty but there are no evident grounds
for this postulate. We may conclude that Sidgwick’s hope—though
not his express intention—to reduce ethics to a single principle,
has not materialized.
37 * Book IV, concluding chapter entitled "The Mutual Relations of
the Three Methods"
38. Some of Sidgwiok’s critics have argued that he does not actually
believe there is so serious a conflict between the two methods as he
appears to. In the course of my study I have not, however, found
sufficiently compelling arguments to assume that Sidgwick does not
mean what he says. In the concluding chapter he describes the recon-
ciliation of the two methods as a matter of life or death to the
practical reason. In the description of his thought he states how
he slowly and reluctantly came to believe that no complete solution
between them was possible. In a previously quoted portion of the
preface to the second edition he denj.es the assumption of some
critics that he is a proponent of only one of the three methods he
examines.
CHAPTER VI
THE WORKABILITY OF UTILITARIANISM
SECTION 1 . The distinction I have employed between the validity
and the workability of a moral principle (and consequently of the
definition of morality on which it is based) is not intended to be
an absolute one. I use it merely as a convenient means of ordering
the arguments of Sidgwick and of Bentham and Mill. Indeed, so far
as logical problems are conoemed, there seems to be no actual
distinction at all. A moral principle which is illogical cannot
be valid, since it contradicts itself. Neither, however, can such
a principle be workable since the more successfully one adheres to
it, the more successfully will he avoid it.
I treat Sidgwiok’s discussion of workability separately and
at some length, firstly, because the workability of utilitarianism
has been a key point at which to attack this principle. Further-
more, Sidgwick presents in these discussions additional proofs for
his reduction of morality to utilitarianism. Finally, it is in the
workability of utilitarianism, especially, that Sidgwick himself
clearly recognizes many of the difficulties of this principle.
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Sidgwick is almost exclusively conoerned with the problems of work-
ability in Books II and IV, In Book II on egoism, he understands
a method to mean determination of the most expedient means to reach
the end (here, one’s own happiness). In Book IV on utilitarianism
he understands it to mean, in general, the determination of uncon-
ditional rules, obedience to which will itself bring about the end
(here, the general happiness). Actually the method of egoism could,
as he admits, be applied equally well to utilitarianism.
1
His two
interpretations of method correspond roughly to the earlier and
later versions of utilitarianism. What he prefers to call the method
of utilitarianism corresponds to the earlier version, as described
in Chapter II. The method of egoism corresponds, when applied to
the utilitarian end, to the later version of Benthsm, according to
whom one sought the end directly and not by dutiful obedience to
rules.
The discussions in Books II and IV form, in effect, a contin-
uous argument, the conclusion of which is that the rules of duty
are themselves implicitly utilitarian and, though subject to serious
problems, are in general a better guide to the utilitarian end than
is the direct measurement of pleasure. Thus this argument involves
a severe criticism (almost a refutation) of the positions of Bentham
and Mill, both of whom relied more or less confidently on the direct
measurement of pleasure for making utilitarianism work.
1. He does not suggest that the method he associates with utili-
tarianism could also be applied to egoism. This alternative seems
plausible however, particularly if one assumes a divine adjustment
of dutifulness and reward.
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The criticism of the direct fona of utilitarianism is the sub-
stance of Book II. A proof for the indirect form together with a
very careful analysis of its problems is the substance of Book IV.
I shall trace the progress of this argument through Book II and then
through Book IV.
The problem of workability for Bentham's utilitarianism—and
for Sidgwick’ s "Method of Egoism"—can otherwise be stated as the
problem of measuring pleasure in order to determine what actions
will, in fact, provide the greatest pleasure. Sidgwick agrees with
Bentham that only quantitative measurement is consistent with
hedonism and. it is suoh measurement with which he is concerned in
Book II. Three techniques for measuring the pleasurable results
of actions are considered*
a. reliance upon one’s own personal comparisons—empirical
hedonism (or the empirical-reflective method),
b. reliance upon the common opinions of mankind—objective
hedonism,
c. reliance upon general laws derived from a scientific
investigation of the concomitants of pleasure and pain
—
deductive hedonism.
The most important criticisms are given in the discussion of the
first technique—empirical hedonism—since Sidgwick concludes, as
we shall see, that the other two techniques are ultimately reduc-
ible to this one.
SECTION 2 . Before proceeding to discuss each of the three
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techniques, Sidgwick gives his definition of pleasure for measuring
purposes. In the refutation of psychological hedonism, he denied
Mill’s contention that pleasure and desire were identical—we do not
always naturally seek pleasure. In that argument he appeared to
understand pleasure as meaning the satisfaction of a desire. This
would seem to he the definition most appropriate to hedonism. But
pleasure can he understood to mean desire itself, in which case,
of course, the two are identical. The latter may he called the
naturalistic definition and is, as we have seen, the basis of log-
ical psychological hedonism. Sidgwick seems here to indicate again
that he does not agree with the naturalistic definition hut does
agree with the hedonistic one. He argues that there may he desires
which are out of proportion with the accompanying pleasure. Still,
he says, pleasure must he defined in relation to desire. ”1 propose
therefore to define Pleasure. . .as a feeling which, when experienced
by intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended as desir-
2
able or—in cases of comparison—preferable.”
If pleasure is a feeling conceived as something one would want,
then it is probably understood here as the satisfaction of a desire.
There seem to be two possible meanings of " feeling”. One is that
it means satisfaction or dissatisfaction and in that case a desired
feeling would obviously mean satisfaction. The other meaning of
feeling would be an emotion or sensation considered objectively.
However, if pleasure means merely an object which would be desired,
2. The Methods of Ethics, p. 127-
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and not a satisfaction which would be desired, then Sidgwick's def-
inition of pleasure is virtually equivalent to Mill's. The only
difference is that while Mill says pleasure means what you want,
Sidgwick says pleasure means what you apprehend as "wantable" •
SDUTION 3 . So far as utilitarianism is concerned, the burden of
Book II is to show the need for some method more effective than
direct measurement of pleasure for achieving the general happiness.
Nevertheless, Sidgwick does not believe that it is necessary to
altogether discard the direct method. Thus, the criticisms he
gives he considers serious but not absolutely conclusive against
either egoism or utilitarianism. Indeed the role he assumes in
this Book is not that of a critic but rather a defender of the
method of direct measurement against the objections raised by
others.
One of the logical difficulties facing utilitarianism, and
indeed any ethics of good, is that the consequences of an act appear
to be infinite and therefore impossible to measure by any definite
standard. This i3 the first problem Sidgwick considers and, since
it is of particular importance and Sidgwick's discussion is rela-
tively brief, I quote him below.
"It may be objected that the calculation of the pleasurable
results of an act is too complex for practice; since any com-
plete forecast of the future would involve a vast number of
contingencies of varying degrees of probability, and to
calculate the Hedonistic value of each of these chances of
feeling would be interminable. Still we may perhaps reduce
the calculation within manageable limits, without serious
loss of accuracy, by discarding all manifestly imprudent
conduct, and neglecting the less probable find less important
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contingencies
; as we do in some of the arts that have more
definite ends such as strategy or medicine. For if the
general in ordering a march, or the physician in recommending
a change of abode, took into consideration all the circum-
stances that were at all relevent to the end sought, their
calculations would become impracticable; accordingly they
confine themselves to the most important; and we may deal
similarly with the Hedonistic art of life."5
Sidgwick’ s conclusion seems to be that the problem of meas-
uring infinite consequences can be avoided by considering only the
most important and most probable ones. He then goes on to other
difficulties. First he discusses what he considers to be two
rather minor ones.
An idealist of the time held that pleasure as feeling could
not be conceived apart from its conditions which were not feelings.
Sidgwick merely notes that his critic refutes himself—for he
argues at great length about the concept pleasure. Another objec-
tion, quickly demolished, is that greatest pleasure cannot be real-
ized all at once and therefore cannot be an ultimate end. The word
end, or good, is not commonly understood as a goal reached all at
once.
The remainder of the ohapter on empirical hedonism is devoted
to three very serious objections to which Sidgwick devotes most of
his attention. The first objection is that if the more permanent
objects of pleasure—such as family, knowledge, culture, etc. are
sought as ends in themselves, then we no longer have hedonism. If,
however, they are sought only as means to pleasure, it seems likely
that they will not provide it. While this problem is indeed the
3. Ibid., pp. 131-132.
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Fundamental Paradox of Egoistic Hedonism, says Sidgwick, it merely
indicates the self-limiting nature of this goal—not its impos-
iihility. First of all, there is oommonly an alternating rhythm
of self-regarding and extra-regarding impulses.^
-
Secondly, even
where this alternation is not adequate, as for example where some-
one initially has nothing but desire for pleasure, still it is
possible for him to achieve it. It is simply necessary for him to
recognize first that the pursuit of other ends is needed for him
to attain pleasure and then to place himself under the control of
one of the many extra-regarding impulses which, at least latently,
still exist within him.
The second of these objections will also be found, in fact,
only to create a certain danger, but not to make hedonism impossible.
The practice of consciously measuring pleasures is apt to interfere
with our full enjoyment of them. On the other hand, it would seem
that pleasure depends on consciousness and the more conscious we
are, the more pleasure we get. At first sight we appear to have
here an irreconcilable contradiction. Again the answer seems to
involve, though less explicitly, Sidgwick* s notion of an alternating
rhythm of extra-regarding and self-regarding impulses. It is not
consciousness per se, but reflective consciousness, which interferes
with enjoyment. Therefore, one must simply avoid measurement at the
moment of actual enjoyment (which is probably accompanying an extra-
regarding impulse) and engage in it later (presumably under the
4. See Chapter IV, Section 4 of this thesis.
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influence of the self-regarding impulse).
The third and most serious objection is that the results of
one's own measurement of pleasure are likely to be either very
imprecise or actually false. In order to determine the weight of
this objection, says Sidgwick, we must answer the following
questions.
a. How far can each of us estimate his own past experience
of pleasures and pains?
b. How far can the above knowledge permit forecasts of the
greatest happiness within one’s reach in the future?
c. How far can one appropriate, for use in such forecasts,
the past experience of others?
Concerning the first question, it seems to Sidgwick that even
the simplest sort of comparison between two pleasures of the same
kind, such as the enjoyment of two types of food or of intellectual
activities, yields a definite result only if the differences in
pleasantness are great. In the majority of cases where different
kinds of pleasures are compared, such as labor with rest or scien-
tific knowledge with charitable enterprise—no confident decision
can be given. Still further difficulties are involved when the
pleasures are mixed with some pain or when an attempt is made to
compare pure pleasures with pure pains and determine the quantity
of one which would exactly balance a quantity of the other.
We must then agree that the results of measuring one’s own
pleasure are not very precise. We must also agree that they are
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apt to be false, since a man’s estimate of any given pleasure is
likely to vary. This is partly because some pleasures and pains
are more easily recalled than others. Thus we often pleasurably
recall a situation which was unpleasant at the time. What we are
recalling is the excitement, which would, by itself, have been
pleasurable. A second and more conspicuous cause of one’s vari-
ations in judgements about the same pleasure is a change in mental
or bodily conditions. The pleasures of appetite cannot be ade-
quately measured if we are full, and when we are hungry they are
apt to be exaggerated. Furthermore, while feeling a pain or an
intense pleasure we will probably underrate other pains or pleas-
ures. These variations cannot be avoided by maintaining a passion-
less state. Some pleasures require prior desire, even intense
desire, in order to be fully enjoyed.
In consideration of the above observations, we conclude that
it is very difficult to estimate one's past experience of pleasure
and pain. Indeed, the problems exposed involve a more general pro-
blem as well. Pleasure only exists as it is felt. Whatever a
person thinks pleasurable, at the moment of feeling it, is pleas-
urable for him. If this is so, however, it is impossible to prove
empirically that pleasures differ, such that each has a definite
intensity. For only one pleasure is ever experienced at a time.
In the li^ht of the more general problem, any comparison that we
could make would, regardless of apparent precision or accuracy, be
merely imaginary . Concerning this general problem, Sidgwick re-
marks, "If. . .we are asked what ground we have for regarding this
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imaginary result as a valid representation of reality, we cannot
say more than that the belief in its general validity is irresist-
ibly suggested in reflection on experience, and remains at any rate
uncontradicted by experience In other words, even if we have
no proof that there are really differences among pleasures, ex-
perience "suggests" that there are. And, Sidgwick argues in a
similar way, experience also suggests that we can measure pleasure—
at least roughly and for purposes of practical guidance. We can
make a number of observations at different times and in different
moods and thus diminish the measuring error.
The final conclusion with respect to question (a) is that we
cannot prove empirically that there are any differences in pleasure
and, even if we could, such differences would be very difficult to
measure precisely and accurately. Nevertheless, when we reflect
on experience we come to believe that such differences do exist and
that we can, at least roughly, measure them.
Question (b) concerned the extent to which our measurements
permitted forecasts of future greatest happiness. In answer to
this question we find that all the problems which make it difficult
for us to measure past pleasures also reappear when we try to predict
future ones. Both our tastes and susceptibilities may change.
The problems reappear again when we consider question (c). In
addition there are certain other difficulties in trying to predict
what will give one pleasure on the basis of other people’s
5. The Methods of Ethics , p. 146.
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experiences. For one thing, these people may differ from us. For
another, our sympathetic awareness of alien experiences may make
U3 bclieYe that we would enjoy or get pain from something when we
actually would not. We might, of course, be able to alter ourselves
so that we would enjoy what we did not before but we do not know
how far this is possible.
Our final conclusion with respect to questions (b) and (c)
must then be the same as for (a). Granted the apparent problems,
we do seem to measure pleasure.
SECTION 4 . Can we avoid the difficulties of empirical hedonism by
resorting to objective or deductive hedonism? Sidgwick » s answer
is no. These two techniques ultimately depend on empirical hedonism.
Objective hedonism—the reliance upon common opinions as to what
gives pleasure—could, at best, only be true for the average man and
actually there is no common agreement about the sources of happiness
or the order of their importance. In interpreting for himself the
findings of objective hedonism, one is thus thrown baok on his own
opinions. A view of hedonism falling midway between objective and
deductive hedonism is the view that doing what is right is the best
source of happiness. This may be true in a settled state of society
but is not in periods of social unrest. Moreover, that it appears
to be so is partly due to the force of law and public opinion, but
to avoid these one need only appear to do the right, not actually
do it. In a perfect society this might not be so but it is now.
Deductive hedonism holds that there are physiological or
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psychological activities or functions that are concomitants of
pleasure and pains. It assumes that these concomitants are them-
selves easier to measure and predict. One philosopher holds that
medium activities are most pleasurable, another that it is full
development of faculties. Even assuming that the concomitants are
easier to measure, there is still the problem of measuring the con-
comitance and this takes us back to all the problems of empirioal
hedonism. Although not explicitly stated, this seems to be
Sidgwick* s conclusion respecting deductive hedonism.
To repeat, then, there is no way to avoid empirical hedonism
as the method of egoism—the only method by which an individual
seeks his own greatest happiness and one of the methods by which it
is possible to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
There is one important qualification to these findings, how-
ever, especially with respect to objective hedonism. Although there
is no agreement about the sources of happiness or their importance,
these disagreements only occasionally cause conflicts. Common sense
opinions are still a generally valid guide to achievement of great-
est happiness—when there are conflicts though, empirical hedonism
must decide.
SECTION 5 . Granted the difficulties of empirical hedonism, is it
possible to find another method that might be more workable so far
as utilitarianism is concerned? Sidgwick does not suggest that we
could find such an alternative for egoism but he does think that
we can do so for utilitarianism. We recall that in Book III he
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eriticizes the narrower intuitionism-the morality of common sense-
as being inconsistent and uncertain. For similar reasons he holds,
in Book II, that common sense is not a valid alternative to empir-
ical hedonism. In other words, common sense is not completely ade-
quate when used to determine unconditional rules of duty nor when
used to determine the best means to the egoistic end. In both
cases, however, he maintains that it is generally adequate.
In Book IV, Sidgwick relies heavily on this position that
common sense judgements only occasionally conflict—a position that
Mill and Bentham would not be likely to grant. In that chapter he
maintains, in effect, that while common sense judgements are not
an adequate alternative to empirical hedonism as the method of
egoism, they are adequate as the method of utilitarianism. Bentham
and Mill had argued, from observing the inconsistencies of duty
ethics, that such ethics should be completely replaced with utili-
6
tariamsm. Sidgwick, making the same general observation but
assuming the general adequacy of duty ethics, reaches the rather
different conclusion that duty ethics is itself, though incompletely
and imperfectly, utilitarian. The morality of common sense is an
attempt to reach the utilitarian end.
We noted in Chapter V how Sidgwick, after having established
the wider intuitions of benevolence, prudence and justice, maintained,
6. In his Utilitarianism , Mill did devote a chapter to showing
that the principle of justice was reducible to utilitarianism.
In so doing he indicated that the rules of justice were purely
expedient, however. He did not at all suggest, as did Sidgwick,
that they still carried about them something of the character of
absoluteness.
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witli virtually no argument, that benevolence and justice both
tended to support utilitarianism. He then inferred that utili-
tarianism was, therefore, the fina] form into which intuitionism
(the narrower intuitionism) tended to pass. This position appears
to be what justifies him in taking the earlier position (in Book I)
that egoism and utilitarianism were signifioantly distinct methods
of ethics in the first place.
How in Book IV, which is on utilitarianism, we find a proof
of the former and, by inference, a proof of the latter of these two
positions. And in so doing, we have justified the separate con-
sideration of utilitarianism by means of which we justify it.
What is the proof which accomplishes this? What proof sup-
ports the position that common sense morality really is an attempt,
though incomplete, to achieve the utilitarian end? For one thing,
utilitarianism supports, in general, the rules of common sense.
Moreover, where these rules conflict, utilitarianism is naturally
called in as arbiter. Thirdly, when people interpret the same
rules differently or support different rules in the same age and
country, they are oommonly found to defend their respective posi-
tions with utilitarian reasons. Finally, the differences in rules
between different ages and countries are usually found to be
strongly correlated to differences in the effects of action on
happiness.
This proof consists of faotual statements about which there
can, of course, be dispute. Sidgwick devotes a chapter to this
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proof much of which consists in elaborating his second point that
utilitarianism arbitrates conflicts among rules. He does, however,
consider some objections to his positions. According to one view
utilitarianism cannot recognize any inequality in the treatment of
persons whereas common sense prescribes it. A person is held to
have special duties toward kindred and those in great need which
he does not have toward others. This problem is not serious for
Sidgwick. If inequality of treatment is the best practical way to
achieve the utilitarian end, as eeems to be the case, then there
is no conflict.
It may be claimed that utilitarianism asks more of men than
common sense does. But in the practical application of utilitar-
ian impartiality, men have more knowledge of their own desires and
needs than they do of others and are thus better able than others
to provide for their own happiness. Also, under the stimulus of
self interest, men are likely to accomplish more generally and thus
more greatly increase general happiness so far as it depends on
labor. It may, on the contrary, be claimed that utilitarianism
asks less. In answer to this objection Sidgwick doubts that common
sense does approve any striking disproportion between sacrifice and
benefit. Furthermore, it is difficult to tell when there really
is a great disproportion because of the remote effeots and the
sympathetic pleasures which may accrue to the one who makes the
sacrifice. Even if the disproportion is truly great it may be
justifiable in terms of utilitarianism to praise a disposition
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which, In general, would Incline toward the utilitarian end.
Ihere is no claim made that the rules of common sense morality
are perfectly utilitarian.
'’Indeed, if it [utilitarianism^] could succeed in proving as
much as this, its success would be almost fatal to its prac-
tical claims
j as the adoption of the Utilitarian principle
would then become a matter of complete indifference. Utili-
tarians are rather called upon to show a natural transition
from the Morality of Common Sense to Utilitarianism, some-
what like the transition in special branches of practice
from trained instinct and empirical rules to the technical
method that embodies and applies the conclusions of
science.
An additional reason, besides these given previously for
holding that common sense rules are instinctively utilitarian, is
the widely accepted theory that these rules derive from past ex-
Q
perience of pleasures and pains. But if this theory is true, then
we have evidence that the rules could not be perfectly utilitarian.
We note, for one thing, that the average man is only partly able
to sympathize with the pleasurable and painful experience of his
fellows. Furthermore, he may not be intelligent enough to see the
real cause of such experiences. Suoh influences deflecting common
sense rules from utilitarianism would be somewhat counterbalanced
by the necessity that the ruleB should at least preserve the society.
But imperfect morality is only one danger to preservation and, in
any case, the rules could be perfectly preservative without providing
maximum happiness. Furthermore, rules appropriate for one time and
7 . The Methods of ethics , p. 425.
8. Sidgwick implies that this theory cannot, on the other hand, he
used as Mill tried to use it to show that such rules «o not now
have the character of absolute Intuitions.
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place might not be so at another.
'
i e must conclude then, that we oannot take the custfcensus of
competent judges, up to the present time, as to the kind of
conduct which is likely to produce the greatest amount of
happiness on the whole. It would rather seem that it is the
unavoidable duty of a systematic Utilitarianism to make a
*
thorough revision of these rules... "9
Thus in Book IV Sidgwiek presents in opposition to the direct
form of utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill that ’’rule utilitarian-
ism" which had proceeded them. But he notes that a perfect rule
utilitarianism, in effect, ceases to be utilitarianism at all. On
the other hand, if rules of duty are not perfectly utilitarian and
are yet the best means for achieving that end, then they must be
made so. For it is ultimately utilitarianism and not duty ethics
(the ’’morality of common sense") upon which exact morality is based.
Sidgwiek considers what amount to three possible techniques
for altering the rules, each one being a bit less drastic than the
preceding. These are*
1. a complete revision of the moral code,
2. retaining the existing code but making gradual modifica-
tions in it,
5. retaining the existing code without any modifications
in the code itself but only in the form of exceptions to
the enforcement of it.
SECTIQH 6 . Regarding the first technique, Sidgwiek finds that a
thorough revision of the rules encounters serious difficulties. In
9. The Methods of Ethics , p. 4^5«
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the first place, people vary greatly and so then must the rules.
But if we consider only a limited homogeneous group, we are dealing
with people who already have a definite code. If we abstract their
code from them so as to replace it with a new one, we are left with
purely hypothetical beings for whom it would be difficult to con-
struct a code. We could not be sure in such a case that they would
immediately accept the utilitarian principle anyway.
It seems that even if the rules were thoroughly revised the
new code could not be immediately introduced. Still it might serve
as an ideal to which existing moral codes could gradually approxi-
mate. But the latter plan also encounters difficulties. His pres-
ent moral oode may be the best that a man can be made to obey.
Secondly, the other aspects of man's nature (which influence what
he finds pleasurable) may change, rendering the ideal obsolete be-
fore it is reached. Spencer proposes to solve this latter problem
by constructing an ideal based not on man’s present nature but on
his nature in the final perfect society. It seems difficult, how-
ever, to predict the nature and relations of such persons clearly
enough to formulate a moral code. And even if we could do so, we
are presently far from such a society, and what appears to be the
most direct way to get there—obedience to its moral code—may not
be. Finally, if we try to find some concomitant of happiness and
make that the practically, though not the theoretically, ultimate
end of our moral code we may find that what we thought to be a
concomitant actually is not. Furthermore, there is no indication
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that we could apply such a supposed concomitant as health or
preservation with any greater precision than happiness. 10
SECTION^, bidgwick concludes from the previous considerations
that a thorough revision of the rules is impossible. It is so
whether the new code is to immediately replace the existing one or
only to function as an ideal. Considering the second technique
,
he now finds that even gradual modifications of the existing code
create serious difficulties. In the first place, the only method
available by which to ascertain these modifications is empirical
hedonism and we have already seen the difficulties of that.
Sidgwick understands Mill to have tried to avoid these difficulties
by simply leaving a large area of activity completely unrestricted.
11
According to Sidgwick, the determination of the boundaries of this
area would itself have to be determined by empirical hedonism, and
furthermore, within that area a moral person who wished to be guided
by the principle of utilitarianism would still have to use that
method.
Given then empirical hedonism as the only possible method for
modifying common sense rules, we find in the second place that any
modification that contradicted an existing rule would be very dif-
ficult to justify. The possible advantage would have to be weighed
against the pain of social disapproval for the one who suggested
10. Arguments similar to these are described in Section 4 of this
chapter in connection with the discussion of deductive hedonism.
11. Sidgwick is referring here to what he considers the main thesis
of Mill's essay On Liberty .
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the change, the weakening of the general authority of moral rules
over men's minds, and the weakening in the man himself of the force
of social approval—a force which tends to strengthen the moral
authority of rules*
There axe also dangers in merely adding to the rules without
contradicting any of them. Granted that the one who suggests a
new rule can himself follow it, he may cause much annoyance to
others and weakening of his own good example by trying to persuade
them to obey it also*
SECTION 8 . There are many problems involved even in a gradual
modification of the rules. However, much of a utilitarian's
attempts to reform common sense rules will merely consist in getting
them enforced. For many rules substantially directed to a utili-
tarian end receive formal acceptance but not the full support of
public opinion.
Now, even in the mere matter of enforcement there are diffi-
culties—mainly in determining what exceptions should be allowed.
This brings us to the third technique. For, "...the admission of
an exception on general grounds is merely the establishment of a
more complex and delicate rule, instead of one that is broader and
simpler; for if it is conducive to the general good that such an
exception be admitted in one case, it will be equally so in all
12
similar cases." Insofar as an exception is of this nature, it
12 . The Methods of Ethics , p. 485*
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seems to be subject merely to the difficulties involved in adding
a rule, which Sidgwick has already discussed. But there are cases
where it could clearly be conducive to the utilitarian end that a
rule should not be applied to all similar cases. For instance,
celibacy would be clearly immoral if universally followed but
would not otherwise be so considered. It may in other words be
moral to do that which would be immoral if widely imitated, although
such cases must be rare. Where these cases do occur the danger of
imitation may have to be avoided by doing the act secretly, and the
act may not be moral unless it is so done. But the notion that
secret acts could be good would be undermining to morality. "Thus
the Utilitarian conclusion, carefully stated, would seem to be
this; that the opinion that secrecy may render an action right
which would not otherwise be so should itself be kept comparatively
13
secret." There can therefore be, in utilitarianism, grounds for
an esoteric morality at odds with the common sense morality.
From initially observing the rough coincidence of common sense
and utilitarianism we now find that there can actually be two di-
vergent and conflicting codes.
"...it may be said that these, too, form part of the complex
adjustment of man to his oiroumstances, and that they are
needed to supplement and qualify the morality of Common Sense.
However paradoxical this doctrine may appear, we can find
uses where it seems to be implicitly accepted by Common Sense;
or at least where it is required to make Common Sense con-
sistent with itself.
13. Ibid., p. 488.
14. Ibid., p. 489*
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Por instance, people commonly think that rebellions are sometimes
morally necessary but these same people hold that such rebellions
should be strongly resisted and their leaders severely punished if
the rebellion fails.
3ECTI0M 9 . We have considered the method of empirical hedonism—
the direct measurement of pleasure—as a means of achieving the
utilitarian (as well as the egoistic) end. We have found that
this method seems to be almost completely unworkable though we do
appear to use it. As an alternative we have considered using the
rules of common sense morality. There is substantial empirical
evidence to the effect that these rules are instinctively utili-
tarian. They are not however completely utilitarian; indeed, if
they were, utilitarianism would be unnecessary. Since they are
not, some revision of the rules is needed. We find, however, that
such revision is extremely difficult to justify. Even worse, we
find that it is expedient for utilitarianism that there be two sets
of rules—an esoteric morality of rules which do not apply in all
similar circumstances, and a common morality of rules that do. We
are not told that such a moral system would be unworkable, yet it
is admittedly paradoxical. (Presumably the determination of which
of these sets of rules will apply in any given case is determined
by empirical hedonism though Sidgwick is not clear on this point.)
CHAPTER VII
SOME LOGICAL PROBLEMS OP SIDGWICK’ S PROOF
SECTION 1 . I have now indicated the problems which Sidgwick
encounters and recognizes in his own proof of utilitarianism. He
tends to represent these problems as empirical ones. Qnpirical
problems are problems resulting from the limitations of the phys-
ical world. They are discoverable by sense observation and are
usually considered the province of scientists rather than
philosophers.
^
It seems, however, that the problems Sidgwick recognizes,
though presented as empirical, at least reflect logical problems.
That is, there appear to be logical contradictions involved in the
very meaning of the moral concepts used. Furthermore, the logical
problems do not seem to be unique to utilitarianism. They seem to
be, in most cases, merely altered forms of the problems of the
agathistic good. The agathistic good is the definition of morality
on which utilitarianism is based.
1. Through history they were not always so considered.
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The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I shall
explain in what way basic logical problems seem to be reflected in
those problems Sidgwick encounters. Secondly, I shall oonsider the
adequacy of Sidgwick* s solutions as solutions to these basic pro-
blems as well as to problems as he presents them.
SJ£TI0N_2. There are two sorts of problems which Sidgwick recognizes
in his utilitarianism—problems of validity and problems of work-
ability.
There are two major problems of validity. The first is the
problem involved in baaing a good (utilitarianism) on a duty (the
duty to pursue it). Although Mill and Bentham seem to deny that
there are any duties at all, Sidgwick claims that they must acknowl-
edge a duty to pursue the utilitarian end. He means that whether
or not a utilitarian, say, tells the truth may depend on the re-
sulting general happiness, but whether or not he pursues the general
happiness does not depend on some still further result. Pursuit
of the general happiness is an unconditional duty for a utilitarian.
The problem in this situation (a problem Sidgwick only implic-
itly mentions) is in the basic meaning of the word pursuit. Pursuit
is an act of a moral agent. The location of initiative for the act
can be one of three possibilities—outside the agent, inside the
agent, or partly inside and partly outside. If the initiative is
wholly outside, then it seems that pursuit simply means obedience
to duty so far as morality is concerned. The term pursuit is sel-
dom used in this way, however. If the initiative is wholly inside,
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then pursuit simply means desire. This usage seems somewhat more
common. We may hear someone say that he desires this or that but
is too tired, busy, etc. to pursue it. We interpret his statement
aa meaning that basically he does not desire the thing so much as
he does the freedom from pursuing it, or he would pursue it.
Our assumption here is only, however, that pursuit and desire
occur together—not that they are the same.
Perhaps the most accurate description of the term pursuit is
that it involves initiative which is partly inside and partly out-
side the moral agent. Strictly speaking, the term "interest" (or
desire) of interest ethics does not have an object. There the term
merely refers to the fact of an act as such. In the term "pursuit"
is the interest which has an object and the object itself is in
some way independent of interest. It must be so since otherwise
pursuit would consist of nothing but interest in interest (a vicious
circle).
If the term "pursuit" is a composite of initiative partly in-
ternal and partly external to the moral agent, then it is very
similar to the term "good". Both "pursuit" and the "good" refer
to desire for something independent of desire (in the case of the
good it might be phrased as something independent of desire which
is desired). However, when the phrase "pursuit of the good" is
used and used meaningfully, the term "pursuit" is being considered
to mean the desire alone while the term "good" is being considered
to mean the something independent of desire.
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What does it mean to claim that there is a duty (something
independent of desire) to pursue the good in view of the foregoing?
It seems to mean that the desire for something independent of desire
is independent of desire, but this is a contradiction.
The apparent necessity to base a good on a duty, and yet the
contradiction involved in doing so, constitutes the first problem
of validity which Sidgwick indirectly encounters.
The second problem of validity is that of developing a con-
sistent moral system from two different and equally self evident
intuitions—egoism and utilitarianism. Sidgwick states this as an
empirical problem but. it seems to reflect logical difficulties.
Even if the world was such that pursuit of one’s own happiness was
the best way to achieve general happiness, still the ultimate end
of any particular individual would have to be a single one. Accord-
ingly, one would choose either egoism or utilitarianism and the
fact that the other end was also achieved would be a matter of in-
difference.
The difficulty which I wish to emphasize, however, is that a
logical (rather than empirical) merger of utilitarianism and egoism
seems to Involve a merger of the agathistic and the hedonistio good
and such a merger is a contradiction. The agathistic good means
that a duty makes itself interesting while the hedonistic good means
the opposite-—that interest makes satisfaction of itself a duty.
In the case of a merger of utilitarianism and egoism, this diffi-
culty is apt to be transformed into a vicious circle as follows*
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a. Interest makes the satisfaction of itself a duty.
b. Satisfaction of private interest is equivalent to the
satisfaction of general interest.
c. Satisfaction of general interest interests the moral
agent.
d. Consequently, the interest whioh makes the satisfaction
of itself a duty is itself made by this duty.
The vicious circle involved in an attempt to merge, logically,
utilitarianism and egoism is the second problem of validity which
Sidgwick encounters, though this problem is not recognized by him
as such.
In his utilitarianism, Sidgwick encounters and recognizes a
great many problems of workability. These problems are connected
with one or the other of the two techniques for achieving the utili-
tarian end—direct measurement of pleasure or rule utilitarianism.
I want to point out some logical difficulties reflected in the pro-
blems of these two techniques. Specifically, I will note three log-
ical problems reflected in the problems of direct measurement and
one in the problems of rule utilitarianism.
Sidgwick recognizes that the consequences of an act seem to be
infinite and therefore difficult to measure. This is the first of
the logical problems of direct measurement and is one of those
Sidgwick most clearly recognizes as such. Of course, stated as a
logical problem, the consequences are not merely difficult but im-
possible to measure.
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Sidgwick also observes that one is more apt to be successful
in achieving pleasure if one does not pursue it directly but, in-
stead, pursues objective values such as knowledge or culture. This
problem seems to be a reflection of the second logical difficulty.
That difficulty is that one cannot have a desire merely for the
satisfaction of desire. Sidgwick recognizes the difficulty when
he uses it as his criticism of psychological hedonism. He does
not, however, consider it a logical one and he only claims that
satisfaction of desire cannot be the only end, not that it cannot
be the ultimate end. However, it seems that satisfaction of desire
cannot be an ultimate end, since an ultimate end is unconditional
while satisfaction of desire is conditional on some objective de-
sire.
Sidgwick raises several other objections to the technique of
direct measurement, all of which seem to reflect the same logical
problem. He argues that the reflection necessary for measurement
of pleasure is apt to interfere with its enjoyment. Moreover, the
measurement is likely to be too subjective due to such things as
mental and bodily changes. Finally, pleasure only exists while felt
and only one pleasure can be felt at a time, so there is no proof
that there are any differences among pleasures in the first place.
The logical problem here is that objective measurement of
pleasure seems impossible. The technique of direct measurement in-
volves the measurement and comparison of the pleasurable results
of various acts. It means the ability to determine how much of
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what one wants is produced by one aot as compared with what is pro-
duced by another. In order for one to determine this, there must
be some standard of comparison.
It seems obsious that the standard of comparison must be what
one wants. Once the most pleasurable acts have been determined,
they are, for hedonism, the ones to be ohosen. Accordingly, there
must be a basis for the choice of these acts. It seems that the
basis for this choice must also he what one wants. Consequently,
the choice of an act is its own standard of comparison and no
separate (objective) standard exists.
Sidgwick' e argument that the reflection necessary for meas-
uring pleasure interferes with it clearly reflects the above pro-
blem if reflection is understood as application of an objective
standard. One cannot get what one wants by comparing acts in terms
of something other than what one wants.
The argument that measurement of pleasure is subjective also
clearly reflects the logical difficulty described.
Sidgwick also denies that there is any proof of differences
among pleasures in the first place. This claim also reflects the
above difficulty. If the very ohoioe of a given act is itself the
standard for measuring its pleasurable results, then comparison is
impossible—for comparison requires a standard separate from any
particular act.
Besides the problems of direct measurement, Sidgwick also
mentions several problems of the other technique of utilitarianism—
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rule utilitarianism. He points out, early in his disoussion, that
rules of duty must not be perfectly utilitarian; for if they are,
then the deliberate choice of the utilitarian end is a matter of
indifference. (I might add that the moral agent must necessarily
be indifferent to the utilitarian end, since he cannot owe ultimate
allegience to two different moral systems.)
As a matter of fact, Sidgwiok believes that rules of duty tend
to be, but are not perfectly, utilitarian. Since they are not per-
fectly utilitarian, they must be made so. Otherwise, obedience to
duty does not always achieve the utilitarian end. Sidgwick finds,
however, that it would be very difficult to adjust the rules for
closer fit. It would be difficult either to get such an adjustment
accepted or to justify it. He also observes that certain duties
best serve the utilitarian end if they are obeyed by some but not
by all. Duties such as celibacy are of this nature. Accordingly,
rule utilitarianism requires that there be an esoteric morality
(indeed a secret morality) in addition to, but different from, the
public rules of duty.
The logioal difficulty reflected in the foregoing problems is
that rules of duty are by definition absolute and unconditional.
Therefore, they cannot be adjusted to better achieve some end. If,
as a matter of empirical fact, the rules of duty are perfectly
utilitarian to begin with, then, as Sidgwick says, adoption of the
utilitarian end is a matter of indifference. If it is claimed that
duty ethics and utilitarianism are logically equivalent, this claim
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is a contradiction in terms.
In view of the foregoing, it would be not merely difficult
but logically impossible to get an adjustment of the rules accepted,
or to justify it. As for the position that utilitarianism may re-
quire an esoteric morality as well as the common one, this problem
does not seem to be, in itself, a logical one. It is not illogical
to claim that 7/hat is a duty for one person or at one time need not
be so for another person or at another time.
Instead of the position that a single set of rules is per-
fectly utilitarian, one might just as feasibly adopt the position
that it is the interaction among a number of different sets that
is perfectly utilitarian. However, this position, while it would
avoid the problem of an esoteric morality, would face all the other
problems mentioned. The basic logical problem of rule utilitarian-
ism—that it is a contradiction in terms—would still remain.
SECTION 3 . Prom the analysis of the preceding section, it appears
that there are at least six different logical problems reflected
in the problems of utilitarianism which Sidgwick recognizes. (See
the following chart. ) I do not think, however, that these logical
problems are unique to utilitarianism. They seem to be merely
altered forms of the problems of a definition of morality. One
would expect that this definition of morality would be the agathistic
good, since that is the definition on which utilitarianism is based.
In some cases this is so but not in all. The probable reason is
that utilitarianism is the one type of agathistic good whose object
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SIX LOGICAL PROBLEMS OF UTILITARIANISM
1. It is a contradiotion to maintain that "pursuit of the good"
(the desire for something independent of desire) is a duty and
therefore independent of desire.
2. Egoism (the hedonistic good) and utilitarianism (an agathistic
good) cannot he reduced to each other without resulting in a vicious
circle to the effect that the duty which makes itself desired is
created by this desire.
5 . The consequences of an ant are infinite and impossible to
measure by a finite standard, such as the good is.
4. The ultimate end of desire cannot be merely satisfaction of
desire. This is a vicious circle.
5 . The measure of pleasurable acts is identical with the choice
of such acts. It is logically impossible to provide an objective
measure of pleasurable acts as a basis for this choice.
6 . Rule utilitarianism is a contradiction since rules of duty
are absolute and not conditional on some end.
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is roughly similar to the hedonistic good. As it happens
, Sidgwick'
s
treatment of the problems of direct measurement is undertaken in the
context of egoistic hedonism and this is the hedonistic not the
agathistic good.
The purpose of this section is to indicate in what way the
basic problems of moral definition have been altered to result in
the problems noted.
It will be recalled that, according to the agathistio good,
morality is ultimately based on duty but the duty attracts the agent
to it and in that sense involves interest.
Although, there may he others, I have recognized two major
problems of the agathistic good.
1. When morality means the pursuit of some goal, an act is
judged not for itself but for its consequences. However, the
consequences of an act are infinite and thus impossible to
measure. This may be called the problem of infinite conse-
quences.
2. When morality means a duty which appeals to some interest
of the agent, this interest must in turn be the appeal of some
further duty and so on ad infinitum. Otherwise, morality is
ultimately a matter of interest alone.
The problem of infinite consequences Sidgwick himself explic-
itly states, though he tends not to regard it as a particularly
serious one. (Problem 3*
)
If one attempts to merge the good with duty ethics, as Sidgwick
does in his rule utilitarianism, then the problem of infinite con-
sequences will be avoided. For one will have combined a monistic
definition of morality with a dualistic one. One simply obeys rules
of duty. However, this attempted solution transforms the infinite
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consequences into a contradiction in terms. (Problem 6.)
Sidgwick does not explicitly state the problem of infinite
regress, but two of the logical problems I have noted seem to be
altered forms of this difficulty.
According to the agathietic good, an object independent of
interest makes itself interesting. There must, however, be a
source of this interest and for the agathistic good it is a higher
object. If, however, one denies that there is a hi^er object,
then one must claim that the object which is independent of inter-
est is nevertheless itself interesting. To put it another way,
the desire for something independent of desire is independent of
desire. (Problem 1.) This position transforms the infinite re-
gress into a contradiction.
One may attempt to merge the two forms of the good, as
Sidgwick wishes could be done (a merger of egoism and utilitar-
ianism). In that case, there will be no infinite regress. For the
duty which makes itself desired will be created by that same desire.
This, however, is a vicious circle. (Problem 2.)
The last two of the six logical problems seem to be altered
forms of the hedonistic rather than the agathistic good. According
to the hedonistic good, morality is ultimately based on interest
but interest makes the satisfaction of itself a value and in that
sense duty is involved.
The hedonistic good faces the same problem of infinite con-
sequences as does the agathistic good. It also, however, faces a
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distinctive problem of infinite regress.
If satisfaction of interest is a value, this value iauat be
the object of some further interest and so on ad infinitum.
Otherwise, morality is ultimately a matter of duty alone.
If one denies that there is a higher interest in the satis-
faction of interest, then there will be no infinite regress. How-
ever, interest in satisfaction of the self same interest is merely
a vicious circle. (Problem 4»)
Moreover, if there is no higher interest, then measurement of
the amount of interest satisfaction provided by various acts must
be made in terms of the self same interest. Consequently, no ob-
jective standard of measurement is possible. (Problem 5 .)
SECTION 4 . The solutions which Sidgwick offers to the problems he
recognizes can, in view of the foregoing, also be considered solu-
tions to the problems of the agathistic good (or in some oases, to
those of the hedonistic good). If Sidgwick is to succeed in reducing
morality to utilitarianism, it is not enough, however, for him to
solve the problems of the agathistle good. He must also, as the
negative aspect of his proof, discredit the other three definitions
of morality. This he clearly does not do. On the contrary, he
claims that utilitarianism (an agathistic good) is really the per-
fected form of duty ethics and he would like to find evidence for
believing that satisfaction of one’s own desires (the hedonistic
good) was exactly fitted to achieve the utilitarian end. The only
one of the four definitions of ethics which Sidgwick clearly dis-
credits is interest ethics.
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It may be that Sidgwick* s negative proof has to be inadequate
in order for his positive proof to have even the appearance of
cogency. From my original analysis of fbur definitions of morality,
it seemed that each definition contained part but not all of what
was necessary to make a moral system logically consistent. More-
over, each definition alone had some serious logical flaw. If
this analysis is correct, then even the mere appearance of positive
proof of some principle would require a merger of several defini-
tions.
Sidgwick* s positive proof for utilitarianism seems, on the
surface, to be more adequate than his negative proof. Three of the
solutions he offers to his problems seem to function as solutions
to the problem of infinite regress.
For one thing, Sidgwick claims that the duty to pursue the
good is not a duty like other duties. It is a wider duty (or as
he calls it, a wider intuitionism) . On the other hand, Sidgwick
does not recognize a wider interest. If this is so, then there is
no infinite regress but neither does one have an ethics of good
any longer. Since the wider duty is ultimate, morality is a matter
of obedience to this unconditional rule and faces the usual criti-
cism of duty ethics—that it seems contradictory.
A second argument which appears to be a solution to the prob-
lem of infinite regress is the argument from common experience.
This is Sidgwick’s final answer to his own problems of workability.
No matter how paradoxical the technique of direot measurement may
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appear, experience indicates that it is workable. Phrased in terms
of the problem of Infinite regress, one would say that experience
indicates that pursuit of the good is possible even though illog-
ical. This sort of argument doesn’t even claim to solve logical
problems—but only suggests that the world is illogical and solu-
tions are therefore unnecessary. Its difficulty is that it can be
used by anyone to support anything.
If it can be shown that egoism (the hedonistic good) and
utilitarianism (an agathistic good) are logically compatible, (not
merely compatible in fact) then this might be a third solution to
the problem of infinite regress. However, these two principles do
not seem to be logically compatible and, in any event, Sidgwick
only looks for empirical compatibility and does not find even that.
Some of Sidgwick’ s solutions to his problems funotion as solu-
tions to the problem of infinite consequences rather than to the
problem of infinite regress.
Sidgwick directly faces the problem of measuring infinite con-
sequences and claims that one can avoid this problem by concen-
trating on the most important and most probable ones. This solu-
tion seems to beg the question since it is impossible to know what
the most important ones are unless one has a view of them all—for
the most important ones are not necessarily the moat probable.
Sidgwick ’s concept of the wider intuitionism seems to function
as a solution to the problem of infinite consequences, as well as
to the problem of infinite regress. If pursuit of the good is
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itself a duty, then one ultimately does not need to measure in-
finite consequences. He only needs to obey the duty. The concept
of the wider duty is, however, subject to the difficulty previously
noted. Moreover, an ultimate duty to pursue the good is doubly
difficult. For the problem of measuring infinite consequences still
remains within the substance of the duty.
A third possible solution to the problem of infinite conse-
quences would be rule utilitarianism, whereby one would automatically
achieve the utilitarian end by obedience to rules. Rule utilitar-
ianism is, however, a contradiction in terms, as Sidgwick indirectly
recognizes. Here again he invokes common experience as an answer
to its paradoxical nature. And, again, it is not an answer to any
logical problem.
There are three other important statements of Sidgwick* s which
could be construed as solutions to one or the other of the two basic
problems I have been considering.
Sidgwick claims that one pursues an end not because of desire
for it but because of an "impulse” toward it. The term "impulse"
must mean desire, duty (initiative independent of desire) or a com-
bination. If it means duty, which is most likely, then this way
1
of describing the good converts it into the right. In that case,
the problems of the agathistic good are, of course, avoided but
only to be replaced with those of duty ethics.
Sidgwick has an unusual definition of the good. He virtually
1. See Chapter I, Section 5 of this thesis.
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defines it as perfectly enlightened interest, yet presumably means
it to retain its character of absoluteness independent of interest.^
This is a contradiction in terms but if the contradiction is not
recognized it may appear that the good and interest are merged.
Sidgwick also has an unusual definition of the right. He
defines it in such a wey that it requires consideration of all
foreseen consequences and yet is still presumably in no way a
3matter of interest. This too is a contradiction in terms and,
here, if the contradiction is not recognized, it may appear that
the good and the right are merged.
Prom the discussion of this section, I reach the conclusion
that the solutions Sidgwick provides to the problems of his utili-
tarianism encounter their own problems in turn. None of his pro-
posed solutions seem to be adequate either for the problems of
utilitarianism or for the agathistle good, on which it is based.
SECTION 5 * It has been frequently mentioned in the course of this
thesis that the logical problems of morality seem to be problems
of definition . Once a definition of morality has been accepted,
there seem to be no particular logical problems in determining
specific moral principles. Despite this situation, much of
Sidgwiok’s thought is devoted to determining moral principles per
se and much of the criticism he has faced is criticism of these
2. See Chapter V, Section 9 of this thesis.
3. See Chapter V, Section 2 of this thesis.
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principles. Accordingly
, it seems important to consider these
principles and some of the criticisms against them.
Since Sidgv/ick inclines, in hia thought, toward the pole of
duty rather than that of interest, he considers that moral prin-
ciples are derived hy intuition. He denies the certainty of duty
ethics per se but claims that there are wider intuitions which
establish both duty ethics and two ethics of good—egoism and
utilitarianism.
An intuition is, by definition, self evident and one would
therefore expect that Sldgwick's wider intuitions could be pre-
sented very briefly and without supporting argument. There may be
situations, however, in which one intuition, while not immediately
self evident, is based on another intuition which is. (Of course
in this situation there must also be an intuition to the effect
that the more evident intuition is indeed the basis of the less
evident one.) Sldgwick's intuitions seem to be of this nature;
for he gives considerable space to justifying the intuitions he
claims to have.
Sldgwick's first intuition—the maxim of Justice—is that:
''It cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it
would be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that
they are two different individuals, and without there being
any difference between the natures and circumstances of the
two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for differ-
ence of treatment. **4
Sidgwick claims that the maxim of Justice is the basis for
4 . The Methods of Ethics , p. 380.
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duty etnics (what he calls the morality of common, sense)* It is
not immediately evident to me that this is the case. In the first
place, if "reasonable ground for difference of treatment" means
intuitive ground, then the maxim would not be accepted by a pro-
ponent of interest, fie would claim that a person's desire was quite
sufficient ground for treating another differently than he would
expect to be treated himself. Another problem is that if one con-
siders morality in complete abstraction from the nature and circum-
stances of an individual, then individuality virtually ceases to
exist. Obviously, it is logically impossible for there to be dif-
ferences in moral aots if there are no individuals to act. The
point at issue ought to be whether there ere ary differences when
the nature and circumstances of the individual are considered.
Sidgwick' s second wider intuition is the maxim of Prudence.
This maxim is that H . . .Hererfter as such is to be regarded neither
5
less nor more than now" with respect to an individual's conscious
life. According to Sidgwick, this maxim is the basis of an abstract
egoism. Sidgwick explains that the intuition means no temporal part
of the good for any individual should be preferred to any other part
merely on the basis of the time difference. Strictly speaking, this
is not what the original maxim says. The maxim, explained, seems to
rest on the implied assumption that what one ought to do is to prop-
erly distribute the good and then merely goes on to indicate what
a proper distribution entails. I do not find the implied assumption
5 . Ibid., p. 581*
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to be self evident—particularly in the absence of an indication
as to what the good is. Determination of what the good is, however,
Sidgwick relegates to a separate intuition.
11 ^ne does assume that what he ought to do is to properly
distribute the good, then is the maxim of Prudence convincing? Is
it intuitively convincing that no temporal part of the good should
be preferred to any other on the basis cf the time difference alone?
Yes, I think it would be so if one could abstract so completely from
the time difference as to even disregard the agent's aversion to a
delay.
In that case, it would be logically impossible for the moral
agent to prefer some temporal part of the good on the basis of the
time difference alone, but only because the time difference had no
relation at all to his interest or duties. The real question for
morality, in the case of this maxim, is whether when interest and
duties are considered it is still true.
The third maxim, the maxim of Benevolence, is that "...each
one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as
much as his own, except insofar as he Judges it to be less, when
impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable by
£
him." This maxim, says Sidgwick, is the basis of a general util-
itarianism—a utilitarianism not made exact however, until one
determines, by a separate intuition, what the good is.
Although this maxim is an intuition, it is, saye Sidgwick,
6. Ibid., p. 382.
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a deduction from two other intuitions. One of these is that the
good of one individual is no more important, from the point of
view of the universe, than that of any other unless more good oan
be realized for one than the other. The other intuition is that
one is bound to aim at good generally and not at a particular part.
The maxim of Benevolence seems to me to have some of the same
difficulties as does the maxim of Prudence. It, too, is phrased
in terms of the good without any explicit indication that this is
part of the intuition. It has a similar logical certainty if the
maxim is understood such that preferences are considered in complete
abstraction from the individuals who hold them. The problem for
the maxim of Benevolence is not to establish that the good, con-
sidered apart from the moral agent, is equal for all but that it
is so when the moral agent's interest and duties are considered.
These three intuitions of Sidgwick have been the subjeot of
much criticism. Indeed the main point I make here has, in slightly
different form, already been advanced by prior critics.
Both P. H. Bradley and Ernest Albee argue that the maxims
—
particularly those of Justice and Benevolence—are merely state-
ments of the objectivity involved in any moral system. Any moral
system implies that there is some reason for a person’s acts in-
7
dependent of the person who does them.
I would agree with this criticism in general but not completely.
7. See especially Albee, A History of English Utilitarianism ,
p. 4045 also Bradley, Mr. Sidgwick
1 s Hedonism , Section 7-
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Those who hold interest ethics would deny that objectivity is in-
volved in every moral system. Moreover, duty ethics may be inde-
pendent of a person only in the sense that the duty is independent
of what he wants and not in the sense that it is the same for
everyone.
Besides the three intuitions already mentioned, Sidgwick has
another which is necessary in conjunction with Prudence and Benev-
olence to establish egoism and utilitarianism. This is the intui-
tion which establishes what the good is, and it establishes that
it is pleasure. Bradley points out, however, that the intuition
that the good is pleasure seems merely to be based on ambiguous
8
use of the word "desirable".
Mill, in his proof of Utilitarianism, argued that the only
proof there was that a thing was desirable was that people did in
fact desire it. He also argued that since pleasure was the only
thing they could desire, it must include what they ought to desire.
The second argument is the position of psychological hedonism and
was criticized by Sidgwick. The first argument has been generally
held to rest on a mere verbal ambiguity between two meanings of the
word desirable—the one (and more common) meaning being what ought
to be desired, the other what simply is desired. Bradley holds
that Sidgwick’ s proof of pleasure as the sole ultimate good involves
this same ambiguity as did Mill' 3. At some points, Sidgwick defines
the desirable as the good, at others he defines it as pleasure—
8. Bradley, Mr. Sidgwick* s Hedonism , Section 3.
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meaning what is desired. Thus obviously he can prove that pleasure
is the good. How if we will reconsider the quotation and subse-
quent comments from Sidgwick' s preliminary proof as discussed in
Chapter V, Section 9, we will see, I think, the truth of Bradley's
criticism.
Sidgwick asks "Shall we then say that Ultimate Good is Good or
Desirable conscious or sentient Life...?"
10
This is a question it
is true, but a rhetorical one—for the answer we finally reach is
a decided yes. Now if this question, understood as the statement
it really is, is considered to be proved, then it is subject to
Bradley’s criticism. If desirable merely raeanB the good, as
Sidgwick virtually suggests by a phrase indicating that the two
terras are synonyms, then his statement is a mere tautology. If
however, desirable merely means what is desired, or pleasure, then
we must look elsewhere than in his argument for the proof that
pleasure is the good.
Sidgwick* s final argument for holding that the good is pleas-
ure i 3 not subject to the above criticism. For his final argument
is on the one hand a straightforward personal intuition and on the
other a comprehensive comparison of common sense judgements.
Both Bradley and another critic, G. E. Moore, agree that of
the two parts of this proof--the appeal to the reader's own intuitive
9. Sidgwick does not always define pleasure as desire, however,
though he does in connection with this proof. Sometimes he defines
it as satisfaction of desire. See Chapter VI, Section 2 of this
thesis.
10. The Methods of Ethics, pp. 395-96.
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judgement and the comprehensive comparison of common sense judge-
ments—the second lacks any force.
11
For in this regard, Sidgwick
finds that Common Sense approves actions roughly in proportion to
the pleasure they produce, hut that finding only proves that virtue
in general is pleasant, not that pleasure is the end. Moore adds
the further point that if Sidgwick's proof is merely considered the
personal intuition he claims, then anyone with a different intuition
may simply deny it.
From this review of Sidgwick's four wider intuitions, it appears
that none of them establish what they are intended to establish.
Their intuitive certainty results from their being either tautologies
or definitions. Even if they were intuitively certain, however, they
would not resolve the logical problems of utilitarianism. For these
problems -underlie the very technique of gaining moral principles by
Intuitions.
11. Bradley, Mr. Sidgwick's Hedonism . Section 6
Moore, Principia Bthica , Section 54
•
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SECTIOK 6. The purpose of this thesis has been to expose the
problems encountered by Heniy Sidgwick in his attempt to base
morality on the utilitarian principle.
My approach in this thesis was to focus upon strictly logical prob-
lems and to consider those problems which were basio to the very
definition of morality on which utilitarianism is based.
J4y procedure was to first consider the problems encountered by
Sidgwick’ s utilitarian predecessors, follow this with a consider-
ation of the problems Sidgwick himself encountered and recognized,
and complete the study with an exposition of the problems Sidgwick
encountered but did not fully recognize.
I found that Sidgwick’ s proof for the validity of utilitarianism
was almost exactly opposite that of his predecessors. He emphasized
the aspect of duty while they emphasized the aspect of interest as
the basis of the principle.
The problems which Sidgwiok found in his predecessors' proof for
utilitarian validity, he felt he had at least partly solved. He
was not so confident of his solutions to the problems of making
utilitarianism work. These problems he explored very thoroughly,
however.
Most of Sidgwick' s problems he represented as empirical, but there
seemed to be clearly logical problems reflected in them. Upon anal-
ysis, it seemed that these problems were (for the most part) merely
altered forms of the problems of the agathistic good.
Sidgwick 1 s solutions to the problems he encountered and recognized
may also be considered as solutions to the logical problems of the
agathistic good. Considered either way, they did not seem adequate.
One important solution—the wider intuitionism seemed to convert
the good into the right. Other solutions 3uch as rule utilitarian-
ism seemed to be simply contradictions in terms. Still others, in-
voking common experience, did not even attempt to solve logical
problems.
The conclusion of this thesis is, therefore, that Sidgwick thor-
oughly considered many of the serious logical problems of utilitar-
ianism, though he himself tended to understand them as empirical
difficulties discovered by empirical observation. He did not, how-
ever, solve these problems. His attempted solutions seem to be
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